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Chapter 1: Introduction 
France is notorious for its colonial and neo-colonial endeavors. Many former French 
colonies are among the most fragile states in the world, including Congo Brazzaville. While 
Congo Brazzaville fits the model of an unstable former French colony, Gabon, a seemingly 
similar former French colony does not. Although Gabon is relatively high on the Failed State 
Index, with a ranking of 99th out of 178 countries and Congo Brazzaville is relatively low, 
ranking 36th,
1
 these states are very similar. The first of these similarities is that they are both 
former French colonies, colonialism in both states was particularly brutal and destabilizing, and 
direct rule was deployed in both cases. Moreover, both states are geographically proximate, as 
they are located in in Central Africa and border one another. They have similar climates, as well 
as an abundance of natural resources, including oil. Furthermore, both Gabon and Congo 
Brazzaville produce roughly equal amounts of oil, with each state producing more than 240 
thousand barrels per day.
2
 Given these similarities, this significant gap in stability begs the 
question as to why Gabon has been relatively successful in maintaining stability, while Congo 
Brazzaville has been unsuccessful.  
To explain these different post-independence trajectories, it is crucial that the differences 
between the two states be discussed. The reasons for this gap must be addressed in order to 
understand why one state was so successful in maintaining stability, while the other was not. 
Given that many states in Africa suffer from instability, these differences are critical in 
explaining what states must avoid and follow in order to maintain stability. In order to answer 
this question, it was imperative to first research all scholarly work on African statehood. This 
                                               
1
 "The Failed States Index Rankings." The Fund for Peace. The Fund for Peace, n.d. Web. 1 Jan. 
2014. 
2 "Congo (Brazzaville)." U.S. Energy Information Administration. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Sept. 2013. 
2"Gabon." U.S. Energy Information Administration. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Sept. 2013. 
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built a greater knowledge of the history of the continent as a whole, and the particular problems 
that have crippled African states. The quality of African statehood laid a general framework, and 
allowed for better understanding of the problems that African states face in maintaining stability. 
Next, two cases were chosen in order to highlight a gap in stability and quality of statehood. The 
constants chosen included: being former French colonies, having similar amounts of oil 
production, and being close in geographic proximity. After selecting the constants, research was 
done by examining the Failed State Index. By looking at the index, two different states that 
satisfied the constant requirement and more importantly, had significantly different scores were 
chosen. Congo Brazzaville would be the unstable state of comparison due to its low ranking and 
Gabon would be the stable state of comparison because it ranks much lower on the index (66 
places higher).
3
 After choosing the states for each case, research was then conducted (each case 
was researched independently) by looking at scholarly articles and newspaper articles. Once the 
research on Gabon was complete, work began on Congo Brazzaville. After completing both 
empirical chapters, an analytic chapter was written which compared and contrasted the two 
isolated cases.  
Upon finishing all research, it is clear, that the reason for failure in Congo Brazzaville is 
due to the political violence that has plagued the state since the early years of its independence. 
While Congo Brazzaville suffered from numerous political coups from 1965 until 1997, Gabon’s 
leaders were much more successful in maintaining power, with only one military coup occurring 
in 1964 (which was later overturned by French military intervention). Although it is easy enough 
to say that political violence has caused Congo Brazzaville’s instability, this explanation is not 
sufficient. During colonialism, the French exacerbated the divide between the urbanized, 
Southern Congolese, and the rural, Northern Congolese, by providing better opportunities for the 
                                               
3
 "The Failed States Index Rankings." 
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Southerners than the Northerners. This caused tensions to rise, which ultimately led to the 
political divide between the two groups after gaining independence. The North-South divide 
would ultimately result in the first military coup in 1963, which was ignored by the French. The 
absence of intervention and the reinstatement of the former president set a precedent that 
militarization of the opposition was not only acceptable; it was successful in changing the state. 
The result of this was continual military overthrow of Congolese Presidents. Thus, while Congo 
Brazzaville and Gabon both experienced military coups shortly after independence, France 
intervened only in Gabon. France’s neo-colonial absence in Congo Brazzaville and neo-colonial 
presence in Gabon significantly impacted the stability of the states and the ability to suppress 
political violence in Gabon and the inability of Congo Brazzaville. 
 To answer this central question, certain terms must first be defined. Due to the ambiguity 
of what a state, an ideal state, stability, and instability are, these terms will be defined to 
eliminate any misinterpretation of the words. In the succeeding chapter, the specific scores and 
rankings from the Failed State Index, the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Human Development 
Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the Freedom in the World Report will be 
explained. Each report and index will be explained in terms of their methodology and what the 
scores and rankings are calculated by. Furthermore, in order to better understand African 
statehood, prior work on this subject will be discussed. The compilation of scholarly work on 
pre-colonial African institutions, colonialism, independence, and post-colonialism will help to 
better understand African statehood and how Gabon and Congo Brazzaville relate to these 
scholarly developments. The chapter will close with a brief discussion on French colonialism in 
particular, and the crippling effects it had upon its colonies due to its policies and actions, paving 
the way for the first case study, Gabon. In order to explain Gabon’s success, the history of the 
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state must first be examined. By looking at pre-colonialism, colonialism, and independence 
within the state, the empirical information on Gabon will help to understand how the state was 
able to maintain stability since independence, especially by focusing on the politics of the state. 
The next case study on Congo Brazzaville will be identical in structure to Gabon’s case study. 
This will allow parallels to be drawn between the two cases, and differences to be distinguished. 
Congo Brazzaville’s history will be discussed, beginning with pre-colonialism, and ending with 
post-colonialism. The next chapter will then seek to bring these two cases together and explain 
why Gabon is more stable than Congo Brazzaville from the differences in each case study. And 
finally, the conclusion brings together all of the chapters, in order to restate the findings and the 
implications for this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Defining Key Terms 
 Given the ambiguity of terms such as the ideal state, the state, stability and instability, it 
will help to define them clearly. In order to eliminate any confusion on, for example, which form 
of the word stability is being used in later sections, this term will be precisely explained in this 
section, along with all other terms. 
The State 
While many scholars offer their own definitions for the term: “the state”, it is clear that 
among these numerous definitions, there is conceptual overlap. These various definitions can 
then be applied to formulate a single definition of the state, which encompasses the most 
fundamental aspects of scholars’ different versions. Starting with the idea that there is an “ideal 
state,” Joel Migdal argues that the closer a state fits the ideal definition of a state, the more 
successful they are in the global system. However, there is considerable variance in how real 
states fit this ideal definition. According to Migdal, the ideal state is an organization of agencies. 
These agencies (run by the state’s leadership) have the power to make and enforce a system of 
rules for the people in a territory. He also adds that the use of force is acceptable in enforcing 
these rules in order to maintain order.
4
 A key component of Migdal’s definition is the notion of 
an authority governing over a territory. Although there are some discrepancies in defining the 
state and its functions, a plurality of scholars agree on including a territory in their definitions.
5
  
                                               
4
 Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988. Print. 
5
 Englebert, Pierre, and Kevin C. Dunn. "Chapter 2." Inside African Politics. N.p.: n.p., n.d. 40-
62. Print.  
5Mentan, Tatah. "Chapter Two: Framing the Problem of the State in Africa." The State in Africa: 
An Analysis of Impacts of Historical Trajectories of Global Capitalist Expansion and 
Domination in the Continent. Bamenda, North West Region, Cameroon: Langaa Research & 
Pub. CIG, 2010. 19-44. Print.  
5Migdal, Joel S.  
5Thies, Cameron G. "The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa." The 
  
8 
Additionally, the use of force to enforce the rules put in place, establishes a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence by the governing authority. According to Max Weber, a territory 
must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in order to constitute a state.
6
 This 
monopolization of the use of legitimate physical force comes from social compliance from the 
people within the given territory. Many scholars agree with Weber’s definition,7 and Englebert 
adds that through a social contract, the people give up certain rights for a collective good, in 
order to gain protection from a governing authority. This authority is seen as using force 
legitimately in enforcing rules, which protects the people.
8
 The people within this territory 
therefore constitute a nation, as Tatah Mentan claims.
9
  
Another critical component of Mentan’s definition is the mention of international 
recognition. A territory is not a state until it is recognized by the international community as the 
sovereign of its territory. Thus, the state comes into being on a specific date when it is finally 
recognized.
10
 Pierre Englebert agrees with this concept, adding that a state must have relations 
with other states, as well.
11
 Consequently, by compiling the most fundamental components of 
different scholars’ definitions, a state can be defined as a territory containing people who are 
governed by an authority, which has the ability to make rules. This authority, through social 
compliance, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which is used to enforce the rules 
implemented. This authority must be recognized by the international community as a state and it 
                                                                                                                                                       
Journal of Politics 69.3 (2007): 729. Print. 
6Weber, Max, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs. "The Profession and Vocation of 
Politics."Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 310. Print.  
7
 Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." International Security 14.14 (1990): 117-39. 
Print.  
7Englebert, Pierre, and Kevin C. Dunn.  
7Thies, Cameron G. 729. 
8
 Englebert, Pierre, and Kevin C. Dunn. 
9
 Mentan, Tatah.  
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Englebert, Pierre, and Kevin C. Dunn. 44.  
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must interact with other states.
12
  
Stability and Instability 
 Stability is essential in order to maintain order within a state. Without stability, state 
apparatuses become weakened and cannot function properly. But what exactly is stability? Very 
broadly defined, stability refers to “the quality or state of something that is not easily changed or 
likely to change.”13 However, there are many different forms of stability, political stability being 
the most relevant in this case. In order to understand political stability, though, Claude Ake 
argues that it is imperative to understand what “the political” is. The political, beginning with 
political behavior, includes an act carried out by a citizen, which “affects the distribution of the 
power to make decisions for that society.”14 Both obedience to the laws and violation of the laws 
constitutes political behavior, according to Ake. Subsequently, the political is the effect of this 
behavior within an organized society. When citizens act predictably in an organized society, their 
behavior is considered a “role” and if it is political, it is a political role. In order to form a 
political structure, there must be a network of political roles.
15
 Traditionally, political stability 
refers to the maintenance of power by leaders.
16
 However, Ake contends that it is specifically, 
“the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The more regular the flow of political 
exchanges, the more stability.”17 In short, it is a political environment that is predictable.18 
                                               
12
 Ibid. 
12"War and the State in Africa."  
12Englebert, Pierre, and Kevin C. Dunn.  
12Mentan, Tatah. 22.  
12Thies, Cameron G. 729. 
13
 "Stability." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 5 Mar. 2014. 
14
 Ake, Claude. "A Definition of Political Stability." Comparative Politics 7.2 (1975): 271. 
JSTOR. Web. 5 Mar. 2014.  
15
 Ibid. 271-2. 
16
 Arriola, L. R. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." Comparative Political Studies42.10 
(2009): 1339-362. JSTOR. Web. 5 Mar. 2014. 
17
 Ake, Claude. 273. 
  
10 
Therefore, stability is a predictable political environment, in which leaders maintain power. 
Instability subsequently refers to the likelihood of government changes.
19
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
18
 Shepherd, Ben. Resurgent Continent? Africa and the World: Political Stability: Crucial for 
Growth? Working paper no. SU004. LSE Research Online, May 2012. Web. 8. 5 Mar. 2014.  
19
 Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel. Political Stability and 
Economic Growth. Working paper no. 4173. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Resarch, 1992. Print. Journal of Economic Growth. 
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Chapter 3: Statistics 
Introduction 
In order to understand the specific indicators of healthy and unhealthy state apparatuses 
and instability and stability, this section will elaborate on what these indicators mean, as well as 
outline all relevant rankings and scores. The indices that will be used are the Fund for Peace’s 
Failed State Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the Human 
Development Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Freedom House’s Freedom in 
the World Report. The criteria for each index will be explained, and the data for both Gabon and 
Congo Brazzaville will be presented.  
Failed State Index 
 The goal of the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index is to serve as an early warning to the 
international community of failing states. By studying the pressures resulting in failing states, the 
organization hopes to help states address the problems they face. The areas of assessment include 
twelve different categories which are scored by the organization’s Conflict Assessment System 
Tool (CAST).
20
 Each indicator is scored on a scale of 1.0 to 10.0 and indicators are broken up 
into three different categories: social, economic, and political and military. The first social 
indicator: demographic pressures, includes a range of pressures such as natural disasters, disease, 
malnutrition, food scarcity, etc. which pose challenges to the government’s ability to protect 
citizens. Refugees and IDPs is the second social indicator, which includes the pressures that 
result from the displacement of the population. The third social indicator is group grievances and 
this pertains to any tension or violence between groups, such as ethnic violence or sectarian 
violence. The final social indicator is human flight and brain drain, which refers to the migration 
                                               
20
 The Methodology Behind the Index." The Fund for Peace. The Fund for Peace, n.d. Web. 1 
Mar. 2014. 
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of people from the state - especially those that are educated. The first economic indicator is 
uneven economic development. This refers to any disparities in income distribution, such as 
slums. Poverty and economic decline is the second economic indicator and deals with inflation, 
unemployment, etc. For political and military indicators, the first indicator is state legitimacy. 
This is determined by looking at corruption, government effectiveness, level of democracy, etc. 
The next indicator, public services, is calculated by looking at the policing, literacy, 
infrastructure, etc. Human rights and rule of law is the third political and military indicator and 
looks at the civil liberties, political freedoms, as well as a number of other factors. Additionally, 
the third indicator determines the effectiveness of the security apparatus by looking at the 
number of military coups, rebel activity, internal conflict, etc. The fourth indicator, the rise of 
factionalized elites, examines the power struggles and political competition within a state. 
Finally, the last indicator looks at the external intervention, so any foreign presence within the 
state, whether this be through UN missions, peacekeeping operations, or foreign military 
intervention.
21
 Now that the scoring of the Failed State Index has been outlined, Gabon and 
Congo Brazzaville’s scores and ranking will be more easily understood. 
 Beginning with Gabon, the state is relatively high on the Index, ranking 99th out of 178 
states, with a score of 72.9. This is a particularly good score for an African state, especially since 
many of Gabon’s neighbors are much lower on the Index, including Congo Brazzaville. The 
individual breakdown of Gabon’s scores shows that a number of indicators are not as much of an 
issue for the African state, as they are for its neighbors. Looking at the indicators, Gabon scores a 
6.8 for mounting demographic pressures, a 5.6 for the massive movement of refugees or 
internally displaced persons, a 3.3 in vengeance-seeking group grievance, a 5.5 chronic and 
sustained human flight, a 7.3 in uneven economic development, a 5.2 in poverty, sharp or severe 
                                               
21
 "The Indicators." The Fund for Peace. The Fund for Peace, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2014.  
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economic decline, a 7.6 in legitimacy of the state, a 7.0 in progressive deterioration of public 
services, a 6.8 in violation of human rights and rule of law, a 5.4 in security apparatus, and a 7.1 
in rise of factionalized elites 
Congo Brazzaville, on the other hand, is relatively low on the 2013 Failed State Index, 
ranking 36th out of 178 states, with an overall score of 90.0. Looking at its individual indicators, 
Congo Brazzaville scores an 8.2 in mounting demographic pressures, an 8.0 in massive 
movement of refugees or internally displaced persons, a 6.0 in vengeance-seeking group 
grievance, an 8.2 chronic and sustained human flight, a 7.0 in uneven economic development, an 
8.7 in poverty, sharp or severe economic decline, an 8.7 in legitimacy of the state, a 7.5 in 
progressive deterioration of public services, a 6.7 in violation of human rights and rule of law, a 
6.7 in security apparatus, and an 8.2 in rise of factionalized elites.
22
 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
 The Corruption Perceptions Index specifically looks at corruption within a state and 
“scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a state’s public sector is perceived to 
be.”23States’ public sectors are scored on a scale of 0 to 100, with a 0 indicating that the state’s 
public sector is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 indicating that a state’s public sector is 
seen as highly respectable. In order to determine these scores and rankings, the CPI pulls data 
from institutions which specialize in analyzing governments. Thus, this indicator specifically 
looks at the government, and not the nation as a whole. Specifically, according to the 2013 
rankings, Gabon ranks 106th out of 175 states, with a score of 34. While it is far from an ideal 
score in relation to the rest of the international community, it is still a higher score than most 
other African states. Congo Brazzaville’s rank for that same year is much higher than Gabon’s. It 
                                               
22
 "The Failed States Index Rankings."  
23
 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013." Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. Transparency 
International, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2014.  
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ranks 154th out of 175 states, scoring a 22. In addition to receiving an incredibly low score, 
Congo Brazzaville’s perceived corruption has actually increased since the previous year, as it 
scored a 26 in 2012.
24
 
Human Development Index 
 The Human Development Index is a report which compiles statistics on education, life 
expectancy, and income, which is then used to rank states in terms of human development. 
Education is  
Measured by the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years 
of schooling for children of school entering age . . . life expectancy at birth . . . is 
calculated using a minimum value of 20 years and maximum value of 83.57 years . . . 
[and] for the wealth component, the goalpost for minimum income is $100 (PPP) and the 
maximum is $87,478 (PPP).
25
 
 
The overall human development score a state receives ranges from 0 to 1.0, with a 0 being the 
lowest human development score, and a 1.0 being the highest. For the 2012 HDI report, 
beginning with Gabon, the state ranks 106th out of 208 states with a score of .683, which is 
much higher than its neighbors, Equatorial Guinea which ranks 136th and Cameroon which 
ranks 150th. Congo Brazzaville ranks 142nd out of 208 states, with a score of .534. This rank 
places Congo Brazzaville below the Democratic Republic of Congo (which ranks 186th), the 
Central African Republic (which ranks 180th), Cameroon, and slightly below Angola (which 
ranks 148th), but significantly higher than Gabon.
26
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a set of data that assess the perceived quality 
                                               
24
 "Corruption Perceptions Index: In detail." Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. Transparency 
International, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2014.  
25 "Human Development Reports." UNDP. United Nations Development Program, n.d. Web. 1 
Mar. 2014. 
26 "Human Development Index and Its Components." UNDP. United Nations Development 
Program, n.d. Web. 1 Mar. 2014. 
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of governance, which are based on surveys conducted by survey institutes, NGOs, etc. There are 
six indicators, the first being voice and accountability which is determined by citizens’ ability to 
participate in choosing their government. The second indicator is political stability and the 
absence of violence or terrorism and this refers to the probability of the government being 
overthrown by illegitimate means. The third is government effectiveness, which is determined by 
the quality of public and civil services, as well as the quality of state policy. The fourth indicator 
is regulatory quality and this includes the ability of the state to create and implement policy. The 
next indicator, rule of law, refers to the obedience to the laws and the quality of the security 
apparatus in enforcing these laws. Finally, the last indicator, control of corruption, refers to the 
extent of which public officials use power for private gain. Each indicator is scored on a scale of 
0 to 100, with 0 being the lowest possible score, and 100 being the highest. According to the 
2012 report, Gabon scores a 24 in voice and accountability, a 57 in political stability and absence 
of violence or terrorism, a 24 in government effectiveness, a 33 in regulatory quality, a 41 in rule 
of law, and a 36 in control of corruption. Congo Brazzaville, on the other hand, scores a 15 in 
voice and accountability, a 31 in political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, an 11 in 
government effectiveness, an 8 in regulatory quality, a 13 in rule of law, and a 10 in control of 
corruption.
27
 
Freedom in the World Report 
 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report, is an annual report that assesses the 
political and civil rights of particular states. These assessments include a 60-point scale for civil 
rights and a 40-point scale for political rights, which are then translated into a 7-point scale for 
each category. A score of 1 is considered the most free and a score of 7 is considered the least 
                                               
27 "Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013 Update." Worldwide Governance Indicators. The 
World Bank, n.d. Web. 20 Feb. 2014. 
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free.  Furthermore, the scores are broken down into the following components: freedom of 
assembly, adequate system of rule of law, freedom to participate in the political process, social 
and economic freedom, accountable officials, free elections, and freedom of expression.
28
 
According to the 2013 report, Gabon was considered “not free”, as it scored a 5.5 freedom rating, 
a 5.0 civil liberties rating, and a 6.0 political rights rating.
29
 Congo Brazzaville received a 
similar, “not free” rating and identical scores to Gabon, with a 5.5 freedom rating, a 5.0 civil 
liberties rating, and a 6.0 political rights rating.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 "Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores." Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 
1 Mar. 2014. 
29 "Gabon." Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Oct. 2013. 
30 "Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville)." Freedom House. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Oct. 2013. 
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Chapter 4: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 What does it mean to be a state in the African state system? With most weak states in the 
world located in Africa, it is not surprising that African statehood is a highly discussed 
phenomenon among many scholars. In order to understand why African states face so many 
problems today, it is critical to refer back to the definitions of the state and the ideal state. After 
observing the definitions of the state and ideal state in the first chapter and comparing these 
definitions to African states, it becomes evident that African states deviate from these traditional 
definitions. From these differences, conclusions can be drawn as to why some states face more 
problems than others. Since the state has been broadly defined, laying the foundation for African 
statehood, it is then critical to look at the pre-colonial institutions in place in Africa. Recognizing 
the complex political systems that were in place before colonization highlights the dismembering 
effect colonialism had on pre-colonial Africa.  
Comparing the ways in which European and African states were created is also helpful in 
pinpointing the adverse effects of colonialism because African states were created less efficiently 
than European states. But state creation was not the only inhibitor to African state development. 
There were many more policies and actions conducted by the colonizers which hindered 
development. Therefore, looking at these colonial policies will help highlight the detrimental 
effects upon African society during colonial occupation. Most scholars agree that colonial 
influence is to blame for the weakness that African states suffer from today, as a result of the 
type of rule used, the colonizers’ ability to disrupt traditional systems, and the introduction of 
capitalism. Even after colonizers left the continent, they still impacted Africa’s development 
through globalization and foreign aid. Many scholars have focused on the perilous situations still 
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existing in former French colonies. By looking at that the policies and strategies implemented by 
the French colonizers, it is clear that these actions were pivotal in producing such dismal 
conditions in these former French colonies. 
Institutions in Pre-Colonial Africa 
 Historically, Africa has always been perceived as a backwards, underdeveloped 
continent; however, this is far from the truth. Colonists saw Africa as a stateless, uncivilized, and 
wild frontier that desperately needed European intervention. People today still believe that Africa 
was a simple society pre-colonialism. Yet, this was not the case. Although, prior to colonization, 
one third of Africans lived in decentralized or stateless societies,
31
 (due to low population density 
and large geographic space),
32
 viable forms of government existed, including kingdoms and 
empires. Political organizations emerged in the form of a confederation of villages. These 
communities of villages typically had institutions and hierarchies, but lacked official boundaries. 
Power was centralized, but did not extend much further beyond the heart of the community. 
Additionally, conflict between villages was rare due to the abundance of land - if people could 
not coexist with opponents, they could simply relocate to another area of land without 
difficulty.
33
 There were even similarities between pre-colonial African and European kingdoms 
because powers were not separated and the king and his men carried out all governmental 
functions - executive, judicial, and legislative.
34
 Moreover, centralized authority was not 
necessary for a sophisticated political system. In the case of the Igbo, they lacked a centralized 
authority. They lived in villages which had no connection to surrounding villages, yet they still 
had a political system in place, through a headman and a council of elders. The Igbos’ 
                                               
31
 Mentan, Tatah. 22.  
32
 Thomson, Alex. An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge, 2000. 9. Print. 
33 Ibid. 9-11. 
34
 Mentan, Tatah. 22.  
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sophisticated political system existed in the absence of a centralized authority, thereby 
reaffirming the complexity of precolonial Africa in the absence of a centralized political 
system.
35
 
Furthermore, African society was built upon the notion of kinship. Through the 
worshipping of ancestors, Africans established strong social bonds with their extended family. 
Typically, these families had a “head” that ensured that members obeyed the traditions of the 
African tribe. These structures provided not only traditional customs; they ensured the security 
and protection of all members. This traditional system in Africa has posed many challenges to 
the modern development of Africa, as many African still put their traditional communities before 
their state.
36
  
The Emergence of the African State System 
 Although Africa was comprised of numerous complex political systems, European 
powers disregarded these institutions and came to Africa to replicate the states they had created 
in Europe. In effect, however, they destroyed the complex societies that pre-colonial Africa had 
already established. This created a troubling phenomenon: African states could not emulate the 
state creation that Europe had experienced before them. Many scholars agree that the way in 
which these states were built was entirely different, explaining the gaps in development between 
the two continents.  
 As explained by Jeffrey Herbst, European states were created from war, while African 
states were not. As a result of war, states were able to more efficiently collect revenue and states 
that did not raise sufficient revenue for war perished.”37 Therefore, state survival depended upon 
revenue collection. This allowed the state to build its army and provide greater protection, as 
                                               
35
 Mentan, Tatah. 22-23. 
36
 Thomson, Alex. 11. 
37
 "War and the State in Africa." 120. 
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well as develop institutionally, in order to provide goods and services to its citizens. This critical 
development improved state functions, enabling its people to unify under one authority. War 
allowed “for the establishment and extension of political authority over subject people and 
foreign territory, and for the organization, maintenance, and reinforcement of that authority.”38 
The state gained social control and was able to assert its power in a more effective manner. Thus, 
Herbst concludes that there is a correlation between nationalism and a state’s ability to extract. 
He argues that with the ubiquity of war, the people felt threatened by external threats and they 
subsequently paid more money to the state. In addition, a strong sense of nationalism emerged as 
the people unified in pursuit of common goals.  Substantial external threats forced the people to 
associate with the state.
39
 External threats are essential to state formation, as the state is the result 
of “efficient banditry” according to Mancur Olson and Pierre Englebert. Similar to Thomas 
Hobbes’ state of nature, bandits begin to pilfer villages, but when these bandits realize that they 
can get more from these villages, they decide to offer protection to villages at a price. This 
arrangement “give[s] them . . . a sufficient time horizon by continuing to invest in violence and 
protecting themselves and their subjects from other roving bandits.”40 Bandits’ racketeering is 
ultimately the source of the state, as it capitalizes on external threats to collect revenue from 
people seeking protection.
41
 European states were also incredibly successful in shifting social 
control from local feudal leaders to the state. As Joel Midgal mentions, once a centralized 
government formed as a result of war, the state gained predominance over local leaders, allowing 
for uniform control. There were no competing authorities vying for power over the people. 
Social control resulted in complete infrastructural power for the state, making it sovereign. This 
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subsequently produced efficient governance.
42
 
African states, on the other hand, were not forged through blood and iron. Rather, their 
borders were drawn by colonizers, who sought to extract as much wealth from the continent as 
possible. According to Mentan, these states were not “African” because they were created by 
colonizers. They were not created to be independent or efficient - their sole purpose was to 
service the exploitative needs of their colonizers.
43
 In effect, African states were rendered 
incapable of collecting sufficient revenue from taxation, which prevented them from establishing 
adequate governmental functions and services. These states additionally lacked any national 
identity, resulting in a disconnected population. Therefore, a unified population and extractive 
capabilities only result from war. Without crisis, it is incredibly difficult to reform state 
structures and to increase nationalism.
44
 Even after the borders were drawn by the colonizers 
hundreds of years ago, there has been no conflict or border change, leaving African states in a 
state of perpetual weakness. There are no external threats to their existence, so unlike European 
state-building, weak states do not disappear.
45
  
Another issue African states face is the competition for power amongst local leaders. As 
Midgal notes, Feudalism was effectively dismantled as European states were created, preventing 
any competition between the state and local leaders for power. According to Migdal, “social 
control rests on the organizational ability to deliver key components for individuals’ strategies of 
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survival.”46 The components of social control are compliance, participation, and legitimation. 
Without these, an official has no predominance. This subsequently results in a struggle for this 
control in Africa because many African states sought to undermine local leaders’ power. In 
Senegal, state officials constantly denounce the clan, claiming that it is an evil to the state. 
However, it continues to grow stronger, which has resulted in armed struggle between the state 
and the clan in order to gain predominance. Without social control, the state is not legitimized 
and unable to assert power over its people and therefore, cannot function properly.
47
  
So what are scholars to make of Africa’s future? Given the problems that African states 
face, Herbst speculates that African leaders could potentially look to the success of European 
state formation as a justification for the use of warfare to create stronger states. Although many 
African states find the current, stable state system more attractive than invading other territories, 
Uganda was invaded by Tanzania in order to oust Idi Amin, showing that “even strong 
proponents of African norms can be driven to interstate conflict if they believe that the costs of 
not acting are high enough.”48 Rather than remain perpetually weak, leaders may become so 
desperate to alleviate poor conditions that they would engage in war in order to build up the 
state.
49
   
While most scholars agree with Herbst’s comparison between European and African state 
formation, Cameron Thies contends that war does not affect the extractive capacity of a state. He 
believes that access to foreign aid and international credit markets deters states from using war as 
a source of revenue collection. These avenues to funds were not available to early modern 
Europe as they are to Africa presently. Thus, war is not required for revenue collection as it was 
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for Europe in the 17th century. He subsequently dismisses Herbst’s conjecture that African 
leaders will resort to war to forge stronger states.
50
 Time will only tell what the future holds for 
African states. One thing is for certain, though; these weak states are not going anywhere 
anytime soon. 
Colonial Africa and Western Rule: Institutions, Policies, and Actions 
 Before colonial powers even arrived in Africa, they marked their territory. In 1885, the 
colonial powers met at the Berlin Conference to discuss the demarcation of Africa, more 
commonly called by scholars as the scramble for Africa. At the conference, colonial powers 
carved up the continent with the intent of exploiting its lands for its abundant resources.
51
 The 
conference allowed the western world to negotiate which territories they would have control 
over, and Herbst makes the argument that this conference was effective in preventing war 
between the European powers in their quest for colonial expansion. They drew up the boundaries 
topographically, using some natural boundaries to divide territories,
52
 with 44% of boundaries 
containing straight lines.
53
 The “ruler straight” borders left Africa significantly disadvantaged 
economically and demographically, as some states were left with virtually no natural resources 
and others were grouped with a myriad of other ethnic groups. Moreover, the Somali people 
found themselves divided between four different modern African states, including, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. This has subsequently caused unrest among the Somali people 
and a desire to unite. Furthermore, 14 states are landlocked, posing significant problems for 
trade. Consequently, colonialism “dehumanized” African boundaries and resulted in a number of 
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issues plaguing the continent.
54
 
 Once the colonists landed in Africa after dividing the continent, most pre-existing social 
and political structures were destroyed. As Tatah Mentan states, Africans had their own 
institutions in place one day, and the next they were forced into a new system that they had not 
agreed to be a part of.
55
 The “African state” was a European invention, and subsequently bore no 
resemblance to Africa. These states had minimal infrastructure and institutions in place, as this 
was “colonialism on the cheap.” Colonial powers were not looking to develop Africa; rather, 
they were looking to extract its natural resources to accumulate greater wealth. Thus, there was 
no planning for African states’ political or economic development, resulting in weak state 
capacity.
56
 The power structure of the state either modeled a direct or indirect form of rule. 
Direct rule required the colonizing state to establish a centralized government within the African 
state, to assert power over the population. Colonizers that used direct rule often had little leeway 
in making their own decisions. Most decisions were made in the colonial state and then trickled 
down to the colonial administrators. In many cases, countries under direct rule would put African 
elites in power - not established leaders. This subsequently resulted in the rise of the African elite 
class because they were delegated with the task of maintaining colonial power over the 
population.
57
 Indirect rule, on the other hand, allowed colonial powers to put local (natural) 
leaders in power, and they were given much more freedom in governing their colonies than 
colonizers governing under direct rule.
58
  Colonists’ policies toward land tenure also had the 
potential to abolish these traditional, pre-colonial structures. Land tenure refers to the 
relationship between people and the land. The rules of this policy determine how this land will 
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be allocated, and traditionally, local African leaders were in charge of deciding who was to 
receive what land, for what, etc.
59
 
Depending on whether colonizers were able to effectively shift land tenure to privatized 
or state ownership of land, colonizers could undermine the power of local chiefs and leaders in 
charge. Some colonizers were successful in disrupting this pre-colonial structure; however, some 
colonizers’ policies were ineffective in eliminating it.60 
Postcolonial African States 
         Once the colonizers left Africa, the expectations for development of African states 
following independence were high. However, post-colonial Africa had little chance of emulating 
the success of European and North American development given the long-lasting effects of 
colonialism. The West was hopeful that African states had the potential to develop into liberal 
democracies, but this proved difficult, as colonial governments were highly authoritarian and 
bureaucratic. Unfortunately, “the political culture that these realities underpinned was hardly an 
appropriate midwife to oversee the birth of new liberal democratic states.”61 The lingering 
memories of past colonial institutions did not create ideal conditions for democracy in Africa.
62
 
Furthermore, African states’ desire to “emulate” Europe was and still is worrisome. Many 
scholars argue that the most severe consequence of colonialism in Africa is the imported nature 
of the European state-system. The nation state has become the source of much turmoil for 
Africa.
63
 Given the differences between European state-building and African state-building,
64
 it 
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was problematic to assume that a universal state system would work for both continents.
65
 This is 
because Africa did not and still does not fit into the North American and European mold. Africa 
poses different challenges to state-building than Europe and North America did because there is 
low population density, large geographical space, and a high level of ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization in Africa that Europe and North America does not have.
66
 The state system, 
coupled with slavery and colonialism, contributed to the deterioration of institutions in pre-
colonial African and the inability of Africa to develop post-independence.
67
 Therefore, the 
implementation of the state-system did not work in Africa. 
Furthermore, the physical drawing of the borders has posed significant problems within 
the continent. Most scholars agree that the European powers arbitrarily drew the boundaries for 
African states, leading to many ethnic tensions and conflicts. Yet, Herbst argued that drawing the 
boundaries based on Africa’s topography was the least likely way to cause conflict. Africa is so 
diverse ethnically and demographically, natural boundaries were the best way to demarcate the 
continent. He also contended that no boundaries have been redrawn since the Berlin Conference, 
reaffirming the legitimacy of these borders. According to Herbst, there was simply no better way 
to draw the boundaries in Africa, and the colonists did the best they could at the time.
68
 
Englebert agrees with Herbst to a certain extent. He contends that there were certain cases, in 
which the African boundaries were negotiated through treaties with local African chiefs. 
However, he asserts that this was likely the case with more politically-centralized governmental 
systems. While there were some exceptions to the arbitrary argument, Englebert certainly agrees 
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that for the most part, African boundaries were not drawn logically.
69
 Even Herbst would agree 
with most scholars because eleven years after publishing “The Creation and Maintenance of 
National Boundaries in Africa,” Herbst changes his view of African boundaries in his book titled 
States and Power in Africa by arguing that the drawing of the boundaries was in fact arbitrary 
(although he never addresses this shift in viewpoint). African boundaries did not encourage 
effective states.
70
  
This view of African borders is shared by most scholars. The capricious manner in which 
the continent was divided paid no respect to preexisting political and social groupings.
71
 Each 
African state is comprised of a myriad of people who differ ethnically, culturally, etc. and do not 
speak the same language.
72
 Most borders drawn by the colonial powers “ran through existing 
political and social units, resulting in many communities finding themselves split between 
different states . . . and caged with new ones.”73 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja similarly argues that 
ethnic and minority conflicts are the greatest challenge to African state-building.
74
 Due to these 
arbitrary borders, many Africans have negative sentiments toward their states, resulting in 
questions of nationality.
75
 Moreover, African traditionalism has caused many Africans to view 
the community as more important than the state.
76
 The disconnect between Africans and their 
state has, in effect, caused many problems for state building, as the state must be tied to its 
people in order to maintain control over its territory. Without the support of the people, the state 
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cannot project power, and therefore cannot function properly.
77
 
 While it is clear that the demarcation of Africa is to blame for many problems within the 
continent, these boundaries cannot be changed. Boundary change would throw Africa in 
complete disarray; therefore, in order to prevent the collapse of African states, an organization 
dedicated to upholding the integrity of boundaries needed to be created.
78
 The Organization of 
African Unity does just that - it protects African boundaries by prohibiting changes to them. 
Most scholars agree that the OAU has successfully inhibited interstate conflict; however, 
Englebert highlights an interesting statistic. While there have been been few border conflicts in 
Africa, African states have been involved in approximately 57% of territorial dispute cases 
which were heard by the International Court of Justice. Yet, Africa’s borders only constitute 33% 
of borders throughout the world. Therefore, the more arbitrary the border, the more likely 
international conflict is to occur.
79
 Colonial powers never intended to create strong, independent 
states in Africa. Through the various policies and actions taken by colonizers, African state 
structures were completely deformed in order to service the needs of the colonizers. And these 
actions not only disrupted African infrastructure during colonization – these decisions made by 
colonizers are still producing serious consequences for African statehood.   
Given these problems, it is apparent that the colonial powers did not think clearly about 
the future of African states. They were not interested in replicating the success of Europe and 
North America in Africa; states were simply structured to fulfill their needs. This disregard for 
African society has in effect, negatively impacted African state formation and development.
80
 
There was no plan to develop African states and create sustainable infrastructure to ensure strong 
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state apparatuses. With the end of colonialism near, “most colonial governments attempted to 
‘Africanize’ their civil service. As a consequence, the numbers of this bureaucratic class swelled, 
as did the numbers of professionals employed by the state.”81 This has resulted in the 
unprecedented growth of state bureaucracies in Africa, as the state has become the largest 
employer of citizens and has additionally led to a connection between political office and 
personal wealth. Political officials in Africa have become notorious for corruption, as the state is 
the only means of accumulating wealth (from natural resource revenue) in these impoverished 
societies. Therefore, officials use the state’s revenues as a personal bank account. Once the 
colonizers left and African states gained independence, the prospect of a developed, liberalized 
democracy was grim. It would prove difficult for states with such a long history of authoritarian 
rule, to break from this system, as most African states, post-independence shifted to one-party 
states.
82
 Colonial characteristics remained existent within African society even after the colonists 
had left the continent.  
Once the colonizers left Africa after states gained independence, political entities that 
were established by the colonizers became “illegitimate” in the eyes of Africans. The effects of 
direct rule and indirect rule can be attributed to this dilemma. With direct rule, the local elites put 
in power were often distrusted by the population because they lacked legitimacy.
83
 After the 
colonists left, these elites remained in power. However, strong public resentment grew against 
those put in power. In states where indirect rule was employed, the colonizers put traditional 
leaders in power, reinforcing their authority, and thus making it difficult for states to gain 
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predominance once the colonizers left.
84
 Thus many African elites that came to power at the 
hand of the colonizers were alienated,
85
 and traditional leaders were legitimized.  This shift in 
who was recognized by the African people as the legitimate power has hindered states’ ability to 
function properly. States are unable to provide basic goods and services to their people because 
they are struggling to displace these organizations that compromise their authority. Without the 
power to assert control over their people, states cannot control their populations, leading to 
further conflict. Herbst adds that if traditional leaders begin to look like the state, they lose 
legitimacy; therefore, there is a disconnect between the state and the people.
86
 Migdal associates 
African states’ struggle for social control with the disruption of political and social institutions 
by colonizers. Land tenure laws also worked to disrupt African infrastructure because colonizers 
did one of two things: either they changed land tenure policies to weaken traditional leaders’ 
power, or they changed nothing. If a colonial power changed the land tenure laws then the 
traditional leaders would become weaker as a result, and then once states gained independence, 
power would shift back to the traditional leaders and states would lack social control. If a 
colonial power did not change the land tenure laws, the traditional leaders would remain 
powerful, and after independence, the central state would still lack social control. Traditional 
leaders were able to retain power if land tenure laws were not disrupted because they dictated 
who was given access to land.
87
 Thus, both colonial policies have subsequently left African 
states in a position of weakness with regard to social control. 
As states gained independence during the early 1960s, most of these governments 
adopted socialist outlooks, in an effort to develop the state and reduce poverty. Most of these 
                                               
84
 Migdal, Joel S. 
85 Ibid. 
86
 States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 194. 
87
 Ibid. 193. 
  
31 
states did not align with the Soviet Union or other Eastern European socialist states; however, 
there were a few, such as Congo Brazzaville, that did align with these socialist states. With the 
exception of these few states, most African states adopted what became known as “African 
Socialism.” This form of socialism emphasized traditional African values, arguing against 
private ownership on the grounds that there was no land ownership before the colonial era; 
therefore, it must be done away with in order to develop. The framework for this political 
structure  
Cast the state in a central role not only politically, but also economically and socially. 
The state would be the engine of development . . . and the state itself embarked on grand 
development projects of infrastructure and industrialization.
88
  
 
African leaders had high hopes for this system. They truly believed that this would end the 
developmental problems which Africa faced, but unfortunately socialism was not the answer. 
Socialism did not work in Africa for a number of reasons, the main being that it could never 
survive given its interaction with the international economy. The one thing that would emerge, 
however, after the shift from socialism, was the one-party system.
89
 
While many states shifted socialist, post-independence, few states actually liberalized 
their economies. Gabon is among the minority of African states which encouraged private 
enterprises after becoming independent. Alex Thomson is quick to say, however, that these 
economies were certainly far from “laissez-faire.” The economy was not simply left up to the 
free market because there was still, to a certain extent, state involvement in the economy. But 
capitalism was unsuccessful in bringing about the development desired by all.
90
 Capitalism 
ultimately broke down African states because traditional networks were eliminated by the 
opening of the economy. States, in effect, deteriorated, which enabled non-state actors to gain 
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power.
91
 States had to eventually “succumb to the demands of international financial 
institutions.”92 Urbanization also contributed to state deterioration because populations were 
abandoning villages and rural areas in order to migrate to the cities. Not only did these rural 
areas become deserted, agricultural production in turn suffered. Currently, more than a third of 
Africa’s 1 billion population lives in cities.93 Moreover, cities created dangerous spaces and 
these ungoverned spaces lacked governmental services as poverty increased. With globalization 
and urbanization, the rich in Africa got richer, as the poor got poorer. As conditions worsen, 
disgruntled groups seeking grievances rise up and threaten national security.
94
 
With the fall of socialism, states began to adopt one-party systems in an effort to 
consolidate power. Personal rule soon resulted from these one-party states, as leaders centralized 
all political activity. All power was concentrated to the executive, making the President 
dangerously powerful. Moreover, leaders sought to eliminate all opposition by limiting 
opportunities for assembly and organized expression. Co-option was another method that leaders 
used in order to suppress opponents, which involved incorporating them into the state system so 
that their grievances dissipated. Many states in Africa began to be plagued by one-party rule, 
including Ghana, the Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and many more. The defense of this system was 
simple: extreme consolidation of power was the only way to maintain stability within a state, and 
ensure that there be no political upheaval, given the ethnically divided nature of many states. 
According to leaders, “Africans would mobilize along ethnic lines, and political competition of 
                                               
91
 Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State 
Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010. 
Print. 
92
 Thomson, Alex. 45. 
93
 "Growth Areas." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 13 Dec. 2010. Web. 5 Mar. 
2014. 
94 Ibid. 46-7. 
  
33 
this nature would simply pull the nation apart.”95 Stability was threatened by coups, schisms, 
factionalism, etc. therefore, strong leadership and a concentration of power was essential in 
suppressing these threats. The problem arose, however, that these “strong leaders” abused their 
virtually unchecked power. Most leaders used the state revenues as their own bank account, since 
they had control of the state. They then distributed this wealth to their networks (friends, 
relatives, clients, etc.) in exchange for loyalty, which helps them maintain their power. This 
system, as Thomson notes, was inefficient because there was no accountability of officials, 
which allowed states to deteriorate.
96
 
When colonizers finally left Africa, Mentan contends that African states began to regain 
normalcy. That was until the West pressured African states to democratize in the 1990s.
 Beginning with Benin in 1989, democracy was officially introduced in Africa. This push 
for democracy was initiated by the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European States, as “Africans demanded multiparty political systems, expanded civil liberties, 
accountable political officials, and free elections.”97 At first, democracy was widely accepted by 
African states, as this seemed to be the solution to all of their problems. Most political leaders 
played along with the this democratization effort and by 1997, almost all sub-Saharan African 
states held democratic elections (36 out of 48). However, these elections did not bring about the 
civil liberties and freedoms the West and Africans had envisioned, as most incumbents were able 
to recapture their positions due to their extensive resources. Thus, democracy proved fruitless in 
opening up the African state. Even after these elections, most states remain “multi-party” states 
through periodic elections, but these elections are far from free. Leaders used these elections to 
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cover up the reality of their one-party state because most elections are marred by fraud, low-
voter turnout, and voter intimidation. Therefore, many scholars agree that the legacy of colonial 
authoritarianism still persists in Africa today, despite the democratization of African states.
98
 
 Africa was forced to transition to democracy, if it did not, then foreign aid would be cut. 
But democracy did little good for African states because more problems emerged than were 
solved.
99
   Given these problems, most scholars agree that the state system does not fit Africa, as 
there is no sense of nationality among Africans. The borders drawn have created serious ethnic 
conflict and tensions among groups that do not wish to be a part of the same collective state. And 
the struggle for power between the state and traditional leaders continues to pose problems to 
state control over its territory. Thus, colonialism not only disrupted the quality of African 
statehood during the period of ruling, it has impeded African states today in achieving the 
success that so many had hoped for after their independence. 
 African State Autonomy 
Although African states finally gained their independence throughout the 20th century, 
many scholars still wonder whether African states are truly autonomous. Globalization, they 
claim, has prevented states from becoming autonomous from the developed world. Foreign aid 
has certainly created dependency among African states because it has become essential for state 
survival.
100
According to Jackson and Rothberg, however, foreign aid and non-interference in 
their affairs, actually inhibits state building, but allows for a higher degree of autonomy.
101
 
African states can replicate, as Englebert calls it, the “colonial blueprint,” which enables them to 
rule without pressure from the international community. They can subsequently assert their 
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power however they choose, while maintaining their weakness.
102
 So while some scholars 
believe that African states are autonomous because of foreign aid, this assistance allows them to 
survive in a state of perpetual weakness.
103
 They will never disappear as long as they are entitled 
to foreign aid. 
African State Weakness 
 Given the severe consequences of colonialism on African statehood, it is no surprise that 
many of these states are incredibly weak. They are weak in the sense that they are unable to 
provide basic services to their people, they cannot implement policies, and they have no social 
control. This fragmented social contributes to African states’ weakness because without 
legitimacy, the state has no authority or control over its people.
104
 The power the state maintains 
is far from absolute.
105
 In certain cases, African states even resorted to one party politics in a 
desperate attempt to compensate for their weakness.
106
 In addition, most scholars note that unlike 
European states during state formation, weak states do not disappear. They settle into “nooks and 
crannies”107 of the international system, remaining perpetually weak, without being punished for 
their military weakness.
108
 Yet, it is important to note that state weakness does not guarantee 
civil society to collapse. In the case of Ugandan dairy farmers, after the state deteriorated and no 
longer provided subsidies to local dairy farmers, they turned to non-state actors for social action. 
Even without the state, dairy farmers will able to maintain profits.
109
 Thus, there are still 
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opportunities for the population to overcome state weakness, and in the case of the dairy farmers, 
avoid poverty. 
French-African Colonies 
While it is clear that state weakness is widespread throughout Africa, former French 
colonies in particular, suffer from state incapacities. This can be attributed to the manner in 
which France disrupted the African societies it colonized. First, Herbst notes that while most 
African boundaries were arbitrarily drawn, French colonial borders were particularly arbitrary. 
They were especially unconducive to building capable states.
110
 France also adopted the method 
of ruling its colonies directly, by putting elites with no authoritative legitimacy in power. This 
resulted in tensions between the ruling elite and the rest of the population, and eventually after 
gaining independence these elites remained in power. Because these “illegitimate” elites came to 
hold power through the state, the population turned to traditional leaders whom they trusted. 
Thus by empowering a politically an unestablished group of elites, French colonizers created 
tensions among the state and its people, rendering the state inefficient in controlling its 
population. This was seen in the case of Senegal, as the Senegalese clan continually gained 
power and challenged state authority, even after being denounced by the state.
111
 The state had 
no social control over its people, as it was competing for authority with more trusted local 
leaders.  
In addition to establishing systems which produced little state social control during 
colonialism, France was also ineffective in disrupting the pre-colonial system of land tenure. 
Although France created many laws which sought to undermine land tenure policies, they were 
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unsuccessful in producing the necessary changes. Again, in Senegal, France was unable to 
disrupt these policies, which resulted in the maintenance of power of the Senegalese clan, over 
the state. It believed that title and registration systems, as Herbst notes, would cause private 
ownership - dismembering the customary system. However, this proved ineffective, as traditional 
leaders maintained control over the land.
112
 Due to these factors, many scholars argue that former 
French colonies are much weaker than former British colonies. In particular, R. M. Grier 
discovered that former French colonies have a significantly lower economic performance than 
former British colonies because of low education levels, post-colonialism.
113
 Therefore, it is 
clear that France deployed strategies which have helped contribute to the weakness and 
instability that these states experience to this day. And former French colonies are particularly 
less stable than other states in Africa.  
This fact is particularly interesting and raises many questions about the practices of 
French colonialism. In order to better understand what French colonialism did to African states, a 
case study was developed by choosing two former French colonies in Africa. These states would 
need to bear many similarities, but be clearly distinct in their state capacity and stability. This 
resulted in the selection of Congo Brazzaville and Gabon. The first case study will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Gabon 
Introduction 
Revered for being one of the most stable states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gabon’s 
maintenance of security in the otherwise unstable part of the world remains a puzzle to scholars. 
While its neighbors struggle to resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts, Gabon appears to the 
world as a somewhat healthy African state. Its relatively low ranking on the 2013 Failed State 
Index, signals its superior statehood to its neighbors, with Guinea ranking 14th, Cameroon 27th, 
and Congo Brazzaville 36th.
114
 Thus, while its neighbors suffer from all of the factors which 
contribute to a higher score on the index, Gabon relatively speaking does not. The quality of 
statehood appears to be much higher than its African counterparts, even though they are all 
located in the same geographic region, and boast impressive natural resource reserves. Gabon’s 
stability raises the question as to how it has been able to maintain security in such a conflict-
ridden region and if the stability is a result of a healthy state apparatus. By looking at the history 
of Gabon, its economy, and politics, Gabon’s maintenance of stability will become clear. 
Geography and Demography 
Gabon is located in Central Africa, bordering Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, 
Cameroon, and the Atlantic Ocean. Its area totals 267,667 sq. km, making it a little bit smaller 
than the state of Colorado. While the area is quite large (77th in the world), its population is 
disproportionately small.
115
 The total Gabonese population was a little over 1.5 million in 2011, 
however, the population density is among the lowest in the world; there were approximately 5.7 
people per square kilometer in 2011.
116
 Despite its low population and population density, Gabon 
houses over 40 different ethnic groups. The major ethnic group, the Fang, amount to 34% of the 
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population, the second largest group is Bapounou totaling 27%, next is M’Bete at 14%, Bandjabi 
at 11%, Bakota at 6%, and Myene at 5%.
117
 Most of the population is predominantly Christian 
(between 55% and 75%) and less than one percent of the population is Muslim.
118
 Gabon has one 
of the highest incomes per capita in Africa; it was approximately $5,469 in 2004.
119
 Its GDP, one 
of the highest in Africa, amounted to $18.66 billion in 2012.
120
 
These various demographic and geographic realities in Gabon are coupled with an 
abundant supply of natural resources as well. The resources that have been discovered in Gabon 
are petroleum, natural gas, niobium, uranium, gold, iron ore, hydropower, timber, diamond, and 
manganese.
121
 Thus, the small population, ethnic fractionalization, and natural resources have 
contributed to an interesting state dynamic in Gabon. While many African states have similar 
characteristics, many of these states have been unsuccessful in maintaining stability. Gabon, on 
the other hand has become a rare exception to the otherwise unstable African region. 
Pre Colonialism 
There is little information on the early civilizations inhabiting Gabon; however, there is 
significant evidence of the presence of Bantu ethnic groups as early as the 14th century. When 
the Bantu ethnic groups first moved to this region of Africa, they pushed the pygmies out to the 
jungles and took over the main land. Social order during this time was an important aspect of 
Gabonese society. Tribal leaders made decisions for tribes and legitimately held the power.
122
 
Portuguese colonists then settled on the land, marking the beginning of the slave trade era in 
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Gabon in the 15th century.
123
 By the 18th century, the Orungu Kingdom arose. The Kingdom 
was incredibly successful in trading with surrounding kingdoms and European traders, and it 
traded a number of goods, including slaves. Gabon became the slave trading hub in Africa, with 
European colonists using its port frequently to acquire slaves. This resulted in increasing power 
and wealth for the ruling Orungu,
124
 while simultaneously depopulating the region.
125
 It was not 
until the arrival of French colonists that the prosperous slave trade was halted.
126
  
Colonialism 
After Gabonese coastal chiefs signed treaties with the French in 1839 and 1841, Gabon 
officially became a French colony. However, the territory was not called Gabon initially by the 
French. When it became a French colony, it was lumped with what are now Congo Brazzaville 
and the Central African Republic, and the territory was called the “French Congo” beginning in 
1859. In 1886, the two territories were demarcated into Gabon and Middle-Congo, but this soon 
changed in 1910 when the territories were once again combined with each other as well as Chad 
and Oubangui-Char to make French Equatorial Africa.
127
 For the purpose of clarity, only the 
name Gabon will be used to refer to the territory. 
France asserted its dominance in Gabon early in its role as the colonizing power. By 
deploying direct rule, all political decisions were made in Paris,
128
 and trickled down to French 
officials in Gabon. However, France faced difficulties in consolidating power, as it was 
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constantly competing with the legitimacy of tribal leaders.
129
 Even though there were 
missionaries from France and Italy as early as 1776, it was not until the 1840’s that their 
influence was spreading. Missions in Baraka, the Congregation of the Holy Heart of Mary, the 
Congregation of the Holy Ghost, and the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception provided 
elementary education to the Gabonese people. This schooling imparted French ideals to the 
Gabonese population, in an effort to transform them from indigenous people to citizens of a 
French colony. Furthermore, schooling was entirely in French, rather than indigenous languages, 
to ensure that the population would be francophone. This was a tool that the French used in order 
to groom the rising Gabonese leadership into the marionettes that would take French orders.
130
 
As colonialism continued, the already small Gabonese population steadily declined as a 
result of brutal French-colonial practices. Thus, a nationalist movement was never able to form 
as the numbers dwindled, allowing the French to retain their firm grip on the African state.
131
 
The repressive nature of French colonialism was beginning to wear the Gabonese down. The 
Gabonese at this time had little to no rights and very few political and economic opportunities.
132
 
Most politicians during this time were pro-French, with very few opposing colonialism. It was 
not until 1900 that Gabonese politics emerged. L’Ecole Montfort was established by the Brothers 
of Saint Gabriel, in Libreville, and African professional teachers provided Gabonese boys with 
higher education (beyond elementary). While the school was shut down just under two decades 
later after its funding from the state was cut (due to the separation of Church and State), it caused 
the Gabonese to assemble and form the Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH); Gabon’s first 
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political organization. The anti-colonialist organization dedicated itself to bringing back the 
schools established by the Brothers of Saint Gabriel, abolishing the indigenat (the French-
colonial legal system in Gabon which suppressed its subjects), increasing its autonomy from 
French Equatorial Africa (AEF), and defending land rights.
133
 The LDH was especially 
concerned with the French system (which was implemented in 1920) of appointing Gabonese 
men with no political legitimacy, as district chiefs. They did this rather than appointing tribal 
chiefs and clansmen who were viewed as legitimate authority figures by the Gabonese people, 
and these new African leaders ignored the former political institutions in place before 
colonialism. They were oppressive leaders, and did not represent the Gabonese peoples’ 
interests. Their poor representation of the Gabonese people led to worsening social conditions for 
the Gabonese, including increased segregation of the Gabonese by the French. Thus, LDH 
members sought to appeal to the French government because they considered themselves to be 
legitimate French citizens, and thus entitled to equal treatment.
134
  
This organization lasted until 1930, when the Gabonese split between pure-blood 
Gabonese and franco-Gabonese. It was not until 1922 that the first political party in Gabon was 
established. Known as the Jeunesse Gabonaise, the party devoted its efforts to speaking out 
against colonialism. This subsequently led to the creation of a petite bourgeoisie and rising 
Gabonese elite, which applied pressure on the colonists. Mulattoes in Gabon were gaining 
political power and their increasing privileges led to the growth of opposition groups and more 
political actors. The slow process of decolonization soon unfolded between 1940 and 1950, as 
many French institutions in Gabon were eliminated and Gabon became a French “overseas 
territory” affording Africans the right to vote. The process of decolonization was not popular 
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with all Gabonese, however. Political factions were established in response to decolonization, 
including Leon M’Ba’s leftist organization. When political organizations continued to pop up 
from the mid 1950’s to 1958, the French government realized the support it had from a few of 
the leading organizations.
135
 In particular, the BDG (Bloc democratique gabonais) and the UDSG 
(Union democratique et sociale gabonaise) both supported the French because  
During the 1950’s . . . the new African elite clearly wanted to demonstrate its desire to 
share responsibility and power, in an amicable and progressive spirit, with the tutelary 
authority.
136
 
 
Eventually on August 17, 1960, Gabon became an independent state
137
 with M’Ba as president. 
Gabon became independent despite the desire of many Gabonese elites to keep France’s colonial 
presence in the African state.
138
 
Independence 
The political structure that arose from colonial Gabon placed the Gabonese elite as the 
ruling class. Once France “left” Gabon in 1960, the elites in support of the French held the power 
in society. M’Ba became a puppet for the French government to protect its private interests in 
Gabon since it no longer had a colonial presence. Thus, French colonialism was directly 
responsible for the pro-French ruling elites that came to power, and France was able to use its 
influence with them to maintain neo-colonial ties with Gabon. The structure of Gabon during 
colonialism shaped the political structure of Gabon post-independence. 
 Gabon’s post-independence political structure was very similar to the political structure 
in its former colonial powers’ state. The political framework included a President, a Prime 
Minister (appointed by the President), and a parliament. Under M’Ba a multi-party political 
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system existed; however, it created much instability in the newly independent state. The 
beginning of instability was marked by M’Ba’s ousting from power in 1964 because of his 
unpopularity with the Gabonese. However, France was not going to allow its pro-French 
Gabonese president to be overthrown by Jean Hilaire Aubame, M’ba’s step-brother. In addition 
to being M’ba’s step-brother, Aubame was M’ba’s political opponent. Their relationship turned 
sour after Aubame refused to support M’ba’s push for a one-party state, resulting in Aubame’s 
seizure of the presidency in 1964.
139
 Shortly after the coup d’etat, French troops intervened, 
bringing M’Ba back to power. This intervention by the French marked the beginning of the neo-
colonialist relationship between France and Gabon, as France reinstated M’Ba in an attempt to 
“protect French interests, particularly the uranium, which was essential for securing an 
independent atomic force, and investments in petroleum, manganese, iron, and wood.”140 France 
knew that if it wanted to remain present in Gabon’s affairs, it needed to keep M’Ba in power. 
Thus, in order to maintain its presence, it acted as a neo-colonial power, reinstating him with 
force. However, M’Ba’s reign came to an end in 1966 when he passed away and was succeeded 
by Omar Bongo. Omar Bongo’s rise to power was yet another neo-colonial act of France, as 
Jacques Foccart (the French government’s chief advisor on African policy) falsified Gabon’s 
Constitution in order to ensure the presidency for Bongo.
141
   
 France meddled in Gabonese political affairs after leaving its former colony because it 
knew its fragile state, and wanted to maintain influence even though it no longer its colonial 
power. The coup d’etat of 1964 exposed the political instability of a multi-party system in a 
newly independent Gabon, for M’Ba’s unpopularity resulted in the opposition ousting him from 
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power. France wanted to maintain its grip on Gabon, and it could only do that through a pro-
France President. Although French troops successfully reinstated M’Ba as President, there was a 
lesson to be learned from multi-party systems in Gabon. This political structure could be 
problematic in maintaining power, as opposition to the state could result in political overthrow, 
as seen with M’ba. Multi-party states make it more difficult for leaders to remain in power, if 
there is room for competition among political actors. Therefore, Omar Bongo, once becoming 
President, decided that he needed to reform the state system in order to retain his power. 
Economy 
 Given Gabon’s extensive supply of natural resources, it is no surprise that France was 
eager to colonize the African territory. As previously mentioned, Gabon boasts an abundance of 
manganese, timber, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, gold, diamonds, etc. Before oil was 
exported from Gabon, timber was its primary export beginning in 1889, as Gabonese mahogany 
produced high quality wood, which many European powers came to exploit.
142
 Many big foreign 
companies came in and began extracting large amounts of timber. These companies’ dominance 
of the timber market inhibited any sort of “Gabonization” of the timber sector within the 
Gabonese economy,
143
 making it difficult for Gabon to diversify its economy. Timber was the 
leading export up until the mid-1950’s, as the amount of timber being exported in 1953 
surpassed 59,000 tons. The price of timber, however, rapidly declined once oil began to be 
exported in 1957, dropping 75% in value in 1960.
144
 The timber industry continued to fall and in 
1979, exports only made up 8.7 percent of the total exports.
145
 Interestingly enough, Gabon 
historically has exported very few products, aside from oil, manganese ore, and timber. It 
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imports most of its food, and has a highly undeveloped agricultural sector.
146
 
 The first major oil discovery was in 1955 in Port Gentil. A year later, production got 
underway at the Ozouri field, and more oil was found at Port Clariette, which is currently the 
main producer in Gabon. Due to these oil discoveries, GDP in Gabon skyrocketed. This marked 
the beginning of Gabon as a rentier state. Rentier states are defined as states that have a large 
amount of rents (rentals) paid by foreign individuals. The governments exporting the oil benefit 
from these monopolistic rents, but the revenue earned has little to do with the production 
process, and more to do with the rents.
147
 This began in 1973 as a result of the oil boom, and 
revenues continued to flourish at its peak in 1976, with 11.3 million tons being produced. While 
Elf Gabon dominates Gabon’s oil sector (the state of Gabon owns 25%), this eventually changed 
in 1983, as American companies, Amoco and Tenneco surpassed Elf Gabon as the leading 
buyers of Gabonese oil.
148
 As Gabon opened up its exports to the global market, it began the 
process of globalization and allowed the Western world more involvement in its affairs. While 
this was good in that it increased oil revenues, the Western presence also meant more scrutiny in 
its affairs. But Gabon faces many other issues, in addition. Due to Gabon’s highly undiversified 
economy, once oil prices declined in the 1980’s, the state was left with no alternative export to 
keep revenues up.
149
 Yet, President Bongo was successful in responding to the drop in the 
market between 1985 and 1987. Michael Reed even goes so far as to say that  
‘Gabon deserves its reputation for having a well-run economy’, because despite low 
world prices it managed to boost production when the U.S. dollar was strong, almost 90 
per cent of its exports being denominated in that currency.
150
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Bongo was able to work around the drop in the market and keep Gabon’s revenues up, despite 
the low price of oil. Yet, this sort of fix is only temporary. Gabon cannot continue to rely solely 
on its oil exports as its only source of revenue. Since oil dominates Gabon’s economy, it has no 
alternative export it can rely upon if prices drop significantly. Its oil revenues are not sustainable 
because of the fluctuations of the market. This could have resulted in grave problems in the 80s 
and will come to be a huge problem in the near future, as oil reserves dwindle.  
 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Gabon’s oil revenues is the patronage network that 
arose during President Bongo’s reign. Only the elites in Gabon benefited from the high oil 
revenues, and this subsequently created a sharp gap in wealth. Bongo would use the state oil 
revenues as his own personal funds, distributing the wealth to his family, friends, and Bateke 
tribe. He kept everyone in the state happy, and even his opponents walked away with a pretty 
penny, which ultimately eliminated any opposition.
151
  
Maintaining Stability: Omar Bongo’s Presidency 
 Omar Bongo succeeded M’Ba as President of Gabon in 1967. He remained in power for 
42 years, with little violence, a feat that has led to much scholarly discourse. Bongo, originally 
born Albert Bernard Bongo, was a member of the Bateke ethnic group, which was known as a 
primitive Pygmy group. During his Presidency, Bongo worked with five different French 
Presidents, beginning with Charles de Gaulle and ending with Jacques Chirac.
152
 His reign has 
caused many scholars to investigate his success in maintaining the presidency and stabilizing a 
newly independent Gabon. As a pro-French President, Bongo received much assistance from 
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France, which ultimately helped to provide stability in Gabon.
153
 The friendly relations between 
Bongo and France allowed France much influence in the state, ensuring access for oil 
companies.
154
 Although Gabon did not (and continues to not) spend much money on its security 
apparatus, it does not need to because of France’s military garrison. The presence of roughly 
1,000 French troops,
155
 post-independence has provided stability in the fragile state.
156
 
Additionally, the military base created the CEDOC, Gabon’s secret services, and the Garde 
Presidentielle (a 2,000 men force), which intimidated Bongo’s opponents.157 
 Furthermore, Bongo was able to consolidate power by legitimizing himself as a leader to 
the peasants living in the rural areas of Gabon. Because of his roots as a Pygmy, the Bantus 
believed him to be  
A mystical individual, a man capable of seeing the invisible and detecting the 
undetectable, a providential being . . . only an individual of this nature could rule . . . 
[thus] Bongo’s leadership was easily accepted.158 
 
Bongo was able to secure social control over Gabon, something that many African leaders have 
struggled to achieve since their states’ independence. He used his Pygmy heritage as a tool to 
legitimize himself, reinforcing this by taking control of secret Gabonese societies (such as 
Bwiti), which are influential in the system of representation in Gabon. Another secret society, 
Ndjobi, has been influential in modern politics in Gabon, and was used by Bongo (in addition to 
Bwiti) as a pillar for his political power. Supernatural power is subsequently essential for the 
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survival of politicians in Gabon, since it reinforces their legitimacy.
159
 
 However, while Bongo was able to obtain social control and maintain stability, he has 
also been responsible for draining the Gabonese economy of its revenues. Perhaps his most 
effective method of retaining his grip on the presidency was corruption. By using the state’s oil 
wealth as his personal bank account, Bongo was able to pay off his opponents, leaving him 
uncontested. He quickly learned that “money could be more effective than bullets in keeping 
power.”160 Thus, anyone who publicly spoke out against the President was paid off, and all 
threats to his power, suppressed. Eventually, as pressure from the international community grew, 
Bongo implemented a multi-party system to appease the West, but it was only a front. Bongo’s 
Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) maintained its power over its opposition in many flawed 
elections, winning nearly all seats in parliament.
161
  
Bongo also adopted a familial approach to governing, as most high-level officials in the 
Gabonese government held the last name “Bongo.” Although Gabon appeared politically stable 
because it did not experience violent conflict like its neighbors, the corruption and cronyism that 
existed during Bongo’s reign exposed the unhealthy nature of the Gabonese state. In 2009, 
Bongo was investigated by Transparency International for embezzlement, due to his extensive 
estate. Bongo owns 33 properties in France, whose total value amounts to a whopping $227 
million.
162
 His extravagant lifestyle and personal pocketing of oil revenues has come at price for 
the Gabonese state. While it was clearly more stable than many other African nations, stability 
did not guarantee high state efficiency. Although Gabon is one of the wealthiest states in Africa 
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with its GDP at 18.38 billion (in 2009), approximately 32.7% of its citizens live in poverty.
163
 
The extreme levels of poverty in Gabon expose the problems that the state faces in improving 
societal conditions. However, in 2009, Omar Bongo passed away at the age of 73, after ruling 
Gabon for 42 years. Next in line for the presidency: his son, Ali Bongo Ondimba. 
Foreign Actors 
 A key component of Bongo’s maintenance of security and power during his reign was his 
relationship with France. As previously mentioned, France maintained a military garrison that 
provided added security to Bongo’s office, affording Gabon a security apparatus that the state of 
Gabon was not required to pay for. Bongo’s relationship with France was a very invested one: 
the former colonial power not only remained present in terms of its military troops, but the two 
states also worked closely together in diplomatic and economic matters. In particular, Bongo 
gave French companies unrestricted access to its oil. By keeping close ties with Gabon, France 
was successful in securing its interests in the oil-rich state and was able to take what it wanted 
from its former colony, without being an official colonial power. 
Bongo also brought in other foreign actors, hoping to increase oil revenues in Gabon. In 
particular, the United States and China have begun to surpass the French in stakes in Gabon. 
China has invested much of its money and efforts in Gabonese iron ore development, making it a 
growing ally of the African state. The United States has also sought to increase its influence in 
the oil-rich state, as it is now the leading buyer of Gabonese oil exports.
164
 The United States has 
also invested money into peacekeeping training in Gabon through the African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI), which will help to maintain stability in the state.
165
 Therefore, Gabon has 
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heavily relied on geopolitics to secure itself from conflict. Because big foreign actors have 
interests and investments in Gabon, they are more likely to provide it with added security to 
protect their own interests. When Bongo’s regime was criticized for corruption, patronage 
networks, and a lack of political reform, Gabon avoided “the outbreak of conflict and political 
reform . . . by the assistance of foreign businesses and governments, and political stability 
prevailed - as did the Bongo’s regime’s network of patronage.”166 Thus, foreign actors have been 
crucial in maintaining stability in Gabon. 
Gabon Today  
President Ali Bongo Ondimba is the current President of Gabon, and was elected into 
office in August of 2009.
167
 Even though he is the son of Omar Bongo, Ali Bongo admitted that 
he would be making many reforms to the Gabonese state. As Gabon seeks to change its 
reputation in the international community from a corrupt and unhealthy state, Ali Bongo wants to 
tackle the challenge of improving the state’s infrastructure. If all goes according to plan, Bongo 
hopes that Gabon will be at emerging market status in 2025.
168
 This would include the patronage 
network ceasing to exist, through centralizing the appointment of people working for the state. 
While Gabon’s contracts with oil companies have remained stagnant even with the change of 
leadership, Ali Bongo has remained determined to eradicate corruption within the government 
and work towards improving the political system. Moreover, it spends a minute percentage of its 
GDP on social programs and subsequently must look to reforming public spending. Additionally, 
Gabon’s relationship with France will likely weaken, as oil reserves decline and Gabon loses its 
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diplomatic leverage. Yet, Ali Bongo has simultaneously strengthened Gabon’s relationship with 
China and the United States through oil contracts, and investments in other sectors.
169
 Gabon 
continues to try to open up its economy to the global market, as Ali Bongo attempts to 
geopolitically develop Gabon. Development of Gabon’s economy is especially crucial, as oil 
reserves are declining and people are demanding more governmental services. That is why Ali 
Bongo wants to wean his state off of its dependency on oil. Gabon’s economy cannot be 
sustained on a finite resource that fluctuates in price with market changes. Therefore, oil cannot 
continue to make up 80% of Gabon’s exports, otherwise the stability that it has been maintained 
from oil revenues will dissipate along with the oil.
170
 
 Ali Bongo calls this plan “Emerging Gabon.” It is an effort to develop the state of Gabon 
through industrialization. Once Gabon can establish industries other than its oil industry, it can 
rely on other raw materials and goods being produced to contribute to its GDP. For example, 
palm oil and rubber plantations will be developed, which will further the diversification of 
Gabon’s economy. This plan, in total, will spend billions of dollars on airports, railways, ports, 
housing developments, and roads, and has already sparked interest among Western countries 
seeking to invest in these projects. It is only a matter of time until the oil runs out in Gabon, and 
thus it is essential for the Gabonese state to prepare for this, through strengthening the state and 
diversifying the economy. However, many criticize Ali Bongo for his overly ambitious goals, 
and are wary that he is simply biting off more than he can chew.
171
 Furthermore, if Bongo is 
serious about dissolving the patronage networks, he will face many obstacles. These networks 
are incredibly complicated and contain many different interests; therefore, disrupting them will 
be difficult. Thus, Bongo’s goals will not be easily attainable. Although Bongo has called for 
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greater transparency and the elimination of corruption, these problems still persist and will 
continue to persist unless Bongo seeks to make these goals a reality. 
State Institutions 
 As previously mentioned, Gabon is a relatively stable African state. It has not 
experienced significant violent conflict since independence, making it appear as a somewhat 
healthy state. But, given Omar Bongo’s one party rule and corruption, many are hesitant to argue 
that Gabon boasts a healthy state apparatus. However, Bongo was not a total tyrant.  Gabon 
Although there were some problems with the healthcare system in Gabon, including poor 
strategizing and budgeting,
172
 during Bongo’s presidency, Gabon made headway in the 
healthcare sector. Health care during his reign was significantly higher than Gabon’s African 
counterparts. For example, for every 250 inhabitants, there was one hospital bed, one doctor per 
4000 inhabitants, 50 private clinics, and 300 Gabonese doctors. Additionally, Gabon established 
the Service de grandes Endemies (SGE) which eradicated smallpox, decreased the incidence of 
leprosy, and better screened for tuberculosis and sleeping sickness. The Centre International de 
Recherches Medicales de Franceville also played an important role in improving the health care 
system in Gabon. It helped the population, trained students, and performed medical research, 
such as looking at fertility problems.
173
 Another important service that Omar Bongo provided to 
his citizens was Social Security. Known as Social Cover or CNSS, the program provided family 
and maternity benefits, workers compensation, and insurance for the elderly and sick.
174
  
Gabon’s health care system has been better in comparison to other African states, but it 
has still been insufficient. In 2011, health care only accounted for 3.25 of GDP, even though 
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Gabon has one of the highest GDPs in Africa.
175
 Looking at its neighbors, Congo Brazzaville 
spends 2.5%
176
, Cameroon spends 5.1%
177
, and Equatorial Guinea spends 4.0%.
178
 While 
Cameroon has a higher expenditure percentage than Gabon, its GDP is significantly less and it 
only spends $128 per capita on health, whereas Gabon spends $512 per capita.
179
 Its 
expenditures are higher than most Sub-Saharan African states, which average at $84.32 per 
capita according to a World Bank Report in 2012,
180
 yet the low government spending in this 
sector is considered equivalent to a poor state’s health care spending. 
 Things are beginning to change under Ali Bongo’s presidency, though. The Caisse 
Nationale d’Assurance Maladie et de Garantie Sociale (CNAMGS), which was established in 
2008, has brought all Gabonese citizens under one health insurance umbrella, extending health 
care coverage to all different socioeconomic groups in Gabon. Since its creation, CNAMGS 
began its coverage of the poorest in Gabon and has since spread to public and private sector 
workers. Once the program achieves its universal coverage, many are hopeful that this will mark 
the beginning of raising health care standards in the Sub-Saharan state. It has experienced many 
setbacks and failures with its health care system in the past; however, CNAMGS’s success could 
be a huge victory for the Gabonese state. Gabon is among the first African states in the Sub-
Saharan region implementing a universal health care system, as many other states struggle to do 
so. It has implemented a mandatory health insurance levy (ROAM) in order to provide a budget 
for the expansive health care system,
181
 showing the world that it is capable of reforming its once 
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poorly-budgeted sector. Without the levies, many are skeptical of the capacity of the universal 
system. They have been crucial in providing the resources necessary to extend healthcare to the 
poorest in Gabonese society - a class that never had access to the expensive medical system. 
 
Moreover, the state of Gabon has been incredibly successful in providing education to its 
citizens, especially compared to other African states. Beginning with Omar Bongo, 21.243 
billion francs were spent in an effort to develop the schooling system, which was an incredibly 
large amount of money spent on education for a developing state. During his time as President, 
100% of children went to school and there were over 900 schools throughout Gabon.
182
 Between 
1995 and 1996, primary school enrollment was 142%, one of the highest percentages in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
183
 However, Gabon only spent 4% of its GDP on education in 2000.
184
 It also 
has one of the highest literacy rates for its region, with the youth averaging at 97.4% and adults 
at 87.0% in 2014.
185
 Currently, primary school enrolment has increased to 184% for males and 
179% for females between 2008-2011. Secondary school enrolment is significantly lower, with 
34% for males and 36% for females.
186
 Although secondary school enrolment is lower than 
primary school enrolment, Gabon’s education enrolment is still higher than many other Sub-
Saharan African states. Most of the funding for higher education in Gabon comes from the state, 
as it finances approximately 95% of the cost for each student.
187
 This is particularly interesting, 
given the steady cutbacks in education beginning in early 2000, which caused much uproar 
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among Gabonese citizens. Since the cutbacks, Ali Bongo has sought to focus on fixing the state’s 
infrastructure, as previously mentioned. This includes working on improving the education 
systems because there are not enough classrooms.
188
 Emerging Gabon will subsequently seek to 
reform the education sector in order to bring Gabon up to global standards. Gabon is one of the 
wealthiest states in Africa, bringing in approximately ten times as much revenue as other African 
states; therefore, it cannot continue to provide minimal services like its African counterparts. It is 
time for Gabon to move beyond stability, and towards state efficiency. 
Conclusion 
 Gabon is a rare case in Africa. As one of the few states in the volatile Sub-Saharan region 
to remain stable since independence and remove from violent conflict, it has done what few other 
African states have. Gabon has maintained stability, but this has certainly come at a cost. 
President Omar Bongo implemented a one party political system, which put down any 
opposition; he maintained close relations with France, and it provided security troops to ensure 
Bongo’s political survival; and he used oil revenues to increase his personal wealth and buy off 
his opponents. His rule was marked with corruption and the state system at the time was not set 
up to provide any benefits to the people, unless they were members of the elite class. Yet, the 
state remained stable. While Ali Bongo is a continuation of his father’s regime, he has only 
maintained the oil contracts with foreign states. Ali Bongo, unlike his father, has recognized the 
problem with Gabon’s dependency on oil. As oil is Gabon’s primary export and accounts for 
50% of its GDP, Gabon is at the mercy of the global market, and when oil prices drop, so does 
Gabon’s GDP.  In order for Gabon to continue its prosperity beyond the projected depletion of 
its oil reserves, it must improve its state capacity. Some progress has already been made through 
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the universal health care system that is almost in full effect, which has provided medical services 
to poor citizens that have never had access before. Ali Bongo has also begun his Emerging 
Gabon plan, which will build plants, plantations, roads, railways, schools, etc., in an effort to 
bring Gabon up to global standards.  
Therefore, the stability of Gabon in the past had little to do with state efficiency. On the 
contrary, Gabon was a relatively unhealthy state, due to its high GDP complemented by 
widespread poverty. The state was secure through the French military presence and political 
dominance of Bongo. The situation in Gabon has begun to shift, however, with the changes that 
are to take place through Emerging Gabon. While progress has been made in Gabon, there is still 
much left to do. Gabon’s perceived corruption is relatively high, according to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index
189
 and according to Freedom House’s report in 2012 Gabon’s status was “Not 
Free.”190 In early 2013, Gabon was removed from the corruption initiative known as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) for not publishing oil revenue and tax 
information.
191
 With these setbacks, it is clear that Gabon is far from achieving the ideal state 
apparatus that it needs to, in order to be a healthy state and maintain stability in the Sub-Saharan 
region. Corruption is its biggest obstacle in entering the global stage. While Gabon has a long 
way to go, it understands the bottom line. As Louis Gaston Mayila put it, “stability is not 
enough. Our world is changing, and we need to look to the future.”192 Gabon cannot rely on oil 
wealth to boost its economy forever. There is a time coming in the near future when Gabon’s oil 
production will sharply decline and it will need something else to protect the state from total 
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chaos. Gabon must transition from a rentier state, to a fully functional, healthy state, otherwise, it 
will fall trap to the problems its neighbors are experiencing today: instability and conflict. 
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Chapter 6: Congo Brazzaville 
Introduction 
What appeared to be a somewhat stable state in Sub-Saharan Africa post-independence 
soon became chaotic, conflict-ridden state. Congo Brazzaville has become a model for the 
modern African state - it is resource rich, yet is incredibly underdeveloped. The economy sector 
is undiversified, as the state relies primarily on its oil, and there is violent struggle for power. It 
is relatively high on the 2013 Failed State Index, ranking 36th out of 178 states, thus it fits the 
model of a typical resource-cursed African state, in the midst of an ongoing political conflict. 
Therefore, in order to better understand what exactly went wrong in Congo Brazzaville and what 
can be done to alleviate the instability, it is imperative to look at the history and current situation 
within the state. 
Geography and Demography 
 Congo Brazzaville is located in Central Africa, bordering Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and the Atlantic Ocean. Its total 
area is approximately 342,000 sq. km, which is only slightly smaller than the state of Montana. 
Like many African states, although Congo Brazzaville’s area is relatively big, (it is 64th in the 
world), and its population in 2013 was estimated at 4,574,099,
193
 its population density is highly 
disproportionate, amounting to only 12.1 persons per sq. km in 2011.
194
 The small population is 
concentrated mostly in the southern region of the state, as the northern region is less-developed 
and jungle-like.
195
 While there are only four major ethnic clusters within Congo Brazzaville, 
within these clusters are over seventy different sub-ethnic groups. The largest ethnic group is the 
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Kongo at 48%, then the Sangha at 20%, the M’Bochi at 12%, the Teke at 17% and Europeans 
and others at 3%. The major religion in Congo Brazzaville is Christianity, as 50% identify, 
followed by 48% identifying with Animism, and 2% with Islam. Its GDP is relatively average 
for Africa, at approximately 13.68 billion USD in 2012; however, its GDP per capita is 
incredibly troublesome, as it was 3,153.74 USD per person in 2012. Its GDP per capita is much 
lower than its African neighbors, given Angola’s is 5,484.83 USD per person, Gabon’s is 
11,430.49 USD per person, but still higher than states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and the Central African Republic.
196
 
 In addition to these geographics and demographics, Congo Brazzaville has an abundance 
of natural resources. These include petroleum, copper, uranium, potash, hydropower, 
magnesium, gold, phosphates, lead, timber, and natural gas.
197
 Congo Brazzaville’s resource 
wealth has done very little in developing the state itself. The GDP versus the GDP per capita 
exposes the alarming reality within Congo Brazzaville - there is an overwhelming amount of 
poverty even though the state has an abundance of natural resources. Therefore, Congo 
Brazzaville fits the profile of an oil-rich state, with large gaps in income equality. 
Pre Colonialism 
 Although there is relatively little research and information on pre-colonial societies in 
Africa, some scholars argue that Congo Brazzaville boasted proto democratic practices and 
egalitarianism during this early time.
198
 The first people to settle in the region were the Pygmies, 
but eventually were replaced by the Bantu. An ethnic group within the Bantu called the Bakongo 
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inhabited modern day Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon in addition.
199
 
There were democratic assemblies run through gentocracies, and the societal characteristics 
consisted of individual autonomy, equality, and a commitment to the community. The “house”, 
was a family, which included a head of the household. These households were not limited to 
familial relations; any free man was able to choose which house he wished to belong to. Houses 
were within a larger framework, called the village, which was the summation of all houses. A 
head was chosen for these villages, leading to the beginning of chiefs within the territory, and 
this chief possessed quasi-divine powers.
200
  
 Eventually, villages combined to form kingdoms in the 14th century AD, ending the 
egalitarian, proto democratic practices. The first kingdom established was the Kongo 
Kingdom
201
 in 1390, which was south of the Congo River. At the head of the kingdom was the 
king, (who was chosen similarly to chiefs) because he was required to have supernatural 
powers.
202
 While the kingdom was considered a loose federation, it expanded its territory 
through conquest within the region.
203
 The Kongo established close ties with the Portuguese, the 
first European settlers in the region, beginning to trade with the Western power. Eventually, the 
Portuguese shifted its focus to the Loango Kingdom, as the slave trade in Africa picked up. The 
final kingdom in the territory was the Teke Kingdom. In all kingdoms, the power of the kings 
remained virtually unchecked. The hierarchical natural of the structure allowed for omnipotence 
of the king. Furthermore, the king could appoint a royal council, which ultimately led to the 
creation of the noble class. The rise of the ruling class in these societies furthered social 
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inequality in the region, which has survived in Congo Brazzaville to this day.
204
 
Colonialism 
 While the Kingdoms within Congo Brazzaville maintained their autonomy during their 
relations with the Portuguese, the territory became a French colony in 1880 after a treaty was 
signed, giving France protectorate rights of the region. However, its period of rule between 1880 
and 1910 was hampered with frequent revolts due to its ineffective control of the territory.
205
 The 
French deployed direct rule within the colony, which was coupled with a struggle for 
predominance in the region against pre-colonial leaders. The French faced difficulty in 
legitimizing their authority in the territory, especially since the African-leaders they were hand 
picking were not seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people. When Congo Brazzaville was 
consolidated into French Equatorial Africa in 1908, which included Gabon, Middle Congo 
(Congo Brazzaville), Oubangui-Chari (Central African Republic), and Chad, Brazzaville became 
the capital, allowing for rapid development and urbanization of the city.
206
 However, France’s 
rule in Congo Brazzaville was brutal until about the 1930s. The territory was pilfered by the 
French, extracting any and all resources it could get its hands on. Moreover, slavery crippled 
African society, as this led to intercommunal fighting, dehumanization of people, large levels of 
migration, and increased stratification of wealth. Colonialism effectively destroyed all pre-
existing political systems.
207
 
 Beginning in the 1930s, the resistance to colonialism subsided, as Africans became more 
political, rather than violent in their opposition to colonialism. This resulted in a movement of 
charismatic leaders, who openly spoke out against the institution of colonialism. Africans began 
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to form a nationalistic movement against colonialism, but these efforts were often put down 
through French political manipulation. The major leader of the movement was Andre Matsoua, 
who appealed to the people because he was seen as a Christ-like figure.
208
 The nature of French 
colonialism began to change, however, during World War II, as many Africans significantly 
aided the French in fighting. The Brazzaville Conference of 1944 reformed French policy in 
Congo Brazzaville, as the French abolished forced labor, decentralized power, allowed for the 
election of local leaders, and extended French citizenship to Africans within the colonies.
209
 
Subsequently, with the victory of the Allied Powers, France extended more political and civil 
rights to it colonies, as well as more autonomy.
210
 This was not enough for the people, though, as 
they demanded more autonomy and rights, ultimately leading to their independence shortly 
thereafter. 
Independence 
 The Congo Republic (Congo Brazzaville) officially gained its independence from France 
on August 15, 1960.
211
 As a result of Brazzaville being the capital of French Equatorial Africa, 
Congo Brazzaville post-independence, was marked by its  high levels of urbanization and 
education. The Southern people had enjoyed civil service and higher education opportunities.
212
  
During the colonial era, the Southern Congolese were presented with ample opportunities 
through education, while the Northern Congolese had fewer opportunities and subsequently grew 
resentful.  By the time the state became independent in 1960, tensions between the two sides 
began to flare, and the state split politically between the African Socialist Movement Party 
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(MSA) and the Democratic Union for the Defense of African Interests (UDDIA). The stark 
differences between the two parties was clear, as the MSA called for weaker ties with France and 
state ownership, while the UDDIA called for stronger relations with France and private 
ownership.
213
 The first president of the newly independent state was Felix Youlou, a man 
educated outside of Congo Brazzaville. He was a northerner, with strong socialist beliefs. 
Understanding the importance of affirming his legitimacy as a leader within Congo Brazzaville, 
Youlou aligned himself with the Lari cult organizations, becoming a Lari priest. In Congo 
Brazzaville, political candidates needed to remain loyal to ethnic traditions in order to maintain 
predominance in the region. Without political legitimacy, leaders cannot consolidate power. In 
Youlou’s case, he attempted to seize power by all means necessary, including manipulating the 
rules and co-opting his rivals. This led to his reorganization of the districts for electoral purposes, 
which helped his party advance further politically. Furthermore, his strategy of arresting his 
political opponents, rehabilitating them into society, and corrupting them by paying them off to 
consolidate them into his party proved similar to the French way of politics. In 1961, Youlou 
dissolved all political parties, except for his, making him the single candidate for the Presidential 
election of that year.
214
 Congo Brazzaville’s new politics became 
 The apotheosis of the ethno regional big man in the context of a heterogeneous new 
polity;  
the struggle for preeminence among such big men at a higher level of politics through the 
instruments of patronage and co-optation; the manipulation of legal rules to concentrate 
power in the person of the president in the name of national unity; and the paradoxical 
extension of social favors to one’s own ethnic or regional community.215 
 
In order to maintain power within Congo Brazzaville, political leaders sought to manipulate their 
control through whatever means possible. For Youlou, his corrupt period of rule ended shortly 
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after his rise to power, when he was militarily overthrown in 1963 by Southerners. This marked 
the beginning of the militarization of politics within the state. The problem that soon arose was 
that the youth of Congo Brazzaville was becoming more radicalized given its higher education 
and lack of opportunities. A radical youth cult formed, demanding frequent worker strikes and 
political overthrow. Given Congo Brazzaville’s history of political upheavals, the youth believed 
it to be its right to take control of the state and reform it into the state it desired. Moreover, the 
1960s was a radical time for many societal groups, as the state remained unindustrialized, with a 
unionized and radicalized workforce, leading to many strikes.
216
 Eventually, the perceived-
corruption of President Youlou led to mobilization and subsequent succession. 
 After Youlou’s fall from power, a provisional government was established, making 
Alphonse Massamba-Debat, a Southerner, president. In 1964, Massamba-Debat declared the 
Mouvement National de la Revolution as the only legitimate legal party within the state, 
solidifying Youlou’s push for a one-party political state. However, his reign was short, as he was 
unsuccessful in meeting the demands of the radicalized population. He fell from power in 1968 
as a result of a special military committee coup. The next in line to the Presidency was Marien 
Ngouabi, a Kouyou northern military captain, who declared Congo Brazzaville the first 
“people’s republic.” Although Youlou and Massamba-Debat, both introduced socialist policies 
into society, Ngouabi became committed to Marxist-Leninist principles. He adopted a Soviet-
style constitution and a similar governing structure, marking the beginning of a new era in Congo 
Brazzaville. His political party became known as the Congolese Labour Party (PCT), dedicated 
to furthering his leftist policies. Moreover, he maintained close state control of the economy as 
well as ties with China and the Soviet Union. In addition, in an effort to address the demands of 
the youth cult, Ngouabi adopted a policy of free education to all between the ages of six and 
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sixteen. Ngouabi also allowed for the size of the state bureaucracy to grow, as many youth were 
virtually guaranteed a position in civil service upon graduation.
217
 However, his Presidency came 
to a halt on March 16, 1977, when he was assassinated.
218
 It still remains unclear as to who was 
responsible, but this exposed the growing radicalization of the people and the failure of Ngouabi  
to suppress it. Following Ngouabi’s assassination, General Yhombi Opango, a northerner, 
became President through a presidential mandate, He remained in power for a short period of 
two years, as his efforts to shrink the bureaucracy and extravagant lifestyle were disliked by the 
population. Moreover, his policies were highly criticized by the PTC and ultimately resulted in 
his removal from power by his fellow Northerners. Opango’s overthrow in 1979 allowed for 
Colonel Denis Sassou-Neguesso to capture the Presidency, which he was successful in 
maintaining for the next twelve years.
219
 
Economy 
 Due to Congo Brazzaville’s abundance of natural resources, it has remained an apple to 
many states’ eyes. The resources which the state possesses are petroleum, copper, uranium, 
potash, hydropower, magnesium, gold, phosphates, lead, timber, and natural gas.
220
 Its 
agricultural products consist of sugar, rice, manioc, corn, vegetables, peanuts, coffee, forest 
products, and cocoa; however less than 2% of the land in Congo Brazzaville is actually 
cultivated. The early stages of Congo Brazzaville’s economic development began during colonial 
rule. Resources within the territory were extracted by private companies, through France. A 
railway was soon built between 1924 and 1934, called the Congo-Ocean Railway, which opened 
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up Congo Brazzaville’s economy by allowing for greater extraction of oil.221  
 Congo Brazzaville’s first primary export was timber during the time of colonization. 
According to reports, there are 12.7 million hectares out of 21.5 million hectares of the state’s 
forests are able to be exploited.
222
 Although logging dominated Congo Brazzaville’s economy in 
the past, it has since been surpassed by the state’s oil industry. Currently the forestry industry is 
under fire, as much of the timber being exported from the Congo Basin, is done so illegally. The 
timber that is being exported is contributing to the deforestation within the state, causing concern 
among many states, as the Congo Basin houses some of the largest rainforests in the world and 
helps stabilize the global climate.
223
 Since the discovery of oil, however, timber exportation has 
rapidly declined, amounting to less than 7% of Congo Brazzaville’s total exports in 1957.224 
Initially, extraction of oil from these deposits was slow, only picking up in the 1970s after larger 
deposits were discovered off the coast of Kouilou. At this point, oil production soared, with only 
500,000 tons being produced in 1971, to 2 million tons being produced in 1973. Revenues soon 
spiked from $25 million in 1972 to $170 million in 1974. During this time, oil represented one 
third of Congo Brazzaville’s GDP, with production averaging about 2 million tons per year. 
Production continued to increase, with the state exporting about 8 million tons per year by 1989, 
and revenues exceeding $1 billion in the beginning of the 80s. But Congo Brazzaville was not 
immune to the dip in oil prices in the late 80s. The state suffered from the falling prices and was 
unable to compensate for the losses. The state’s policy of “borrowing based largely on projected 
oil revenues inflated the national debt from $1.2 billion in 1980 to $4.5 billion in 1990, and made 
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the state the most indebted per capita on Earth.”225 This subsequently contributed to the waning 
support of Sassou-Nguesso in the early 90s, and his slipping grip on power.
226
 By 1991, there 
was a strong push for democracy within the state, and Sassou-Nguesso had no other option than 
to concede to the demands of the international community. In 1992, Sassou-Nguesso lost in the 
first round of the Presidential elections, with Pascal Lissouba emerging victorious. On August 
31, 1992, President Lissouba was inaugurated.
227
 More financial problems ensued, following 
Lissouba’s inauguration. In 1994, France handed over Congo Brazzaville’s debt to the IMF, 
resulting in the sharp devaluation of the CFA Franc (50%).
228
  
The state’s inability to effectively deal with the drop in oil prices was and still remains 
problematic. Given the fact that the oil reserves within Congo Brazzaville are rapidly 
deteriorating, it is only a matter of time until they run out. The economy remains undiversified, 
with oil exports amounting to 70% of the state’s revenue. The level of poverty within the oil-rich 
state is also worrisome, as oil money stays within the hands of the political elite. In 2011, it was 
reported that 46.5% of the population lived below the poverty line and 53% of the population in 
unemployed. And as previously mentioned, Congo Brazzaville has one of the lowest GDP per 
capitas in the world, at $3,153 per person.
229
    
Democracy leads to Political Instability 
 The push for democracy in Africa was not a new phenomenon. The international 
community pressured many states within Africa to dissolve the former one-party political system 
that plagued their state apparatuses. While there were some more successful cases in this 
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transition into democracy, Congo Brazzaville failed to reap the benefits of a democratic society. 
Rather, the implementation of democracy created significant instability. With new system of 
government and a growing divide between the Northerners and Southerners, there was much 
uncertainty which resulted in increased competition for control over resources. Given the 
Northerners control of the state through Sassou-Nguesso’s presidency, the elections provided an 
opportunity for the South to regain control. The elections “spark[ed] competition for the apex of 
Congo’s patron-client pyramid and giving southern elites a legally sanctioned chance to control 
the state’s oil wealth.”230 The South now had the ability to seize control over oil assets, 
legitimately removing the Northern, Sassou-Nguesso from power. Once President Lissouba was 
elected, he faced much opposition from not only the people, but from his political opponents, as 
well. The 1992 elections subsequently led to the militarization of Sassou-Nguesso and 
Lissouba’s runner-up in the presidential elections of 1991, Bernard Koleas. With an increasing 
security dilemma, Lissouba established his own security force, known as the Cocoye. Both 
opponents of Lissouba also formed militias, Sassou-Nguesso’s Cobras and Koleas’ Ninjas. Much 
of Lissouba’s criticism stemmed from his favoritism of Southerners, as he is from the region. 
Moreover, his liberalization of the economy, cuts in public expenditures, and decentralization 
were very unfavorable to the people. As a result of democratization, salaries were not able to be 
paid, social services disappeared, unemployment rates skyrocketed among an educated 
population, and the national infrastructure began to crumble. Furthermore, since the bureaucracy 
had grown so large as a result of oil revenues, most educated people expected to work as a civil 
servant and were displeased when this opportunity was lost. Simply becoming President “did not 
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guarantee [Lissouba] ownership over Sassou’s former networks of allies, patrons, and clients.”231 
Although Lissouba had legitimized his power and control over the state, many senior army 
officers stayed loyal to Sassou-Nguesso, and therefore Lissouba had little control over the state’s 
military. Furthermore, foreign allies remained loyal to Sassou-Nguesso, including France, 
Angola, and Gabon. Thus, Lissouba lacked support from foreign allies and control over the 
military regardless of his title as President. He had no social control. In a desperate attempt to 
regain control over the state, Lissouba dissipated the parliament in 1992, which forced new 
elections to be held in 1993. Lissouba’s party won 62 seats, while Koleas and Sassou’s parties 
combined only won 49.
232
 Claiming election fraud, violence broke out, causing a civil war 
between the political militias between 1993 and 1994.
233
 These clashes exposed the ethno 
regional fractionalization of the state; however, the split between ethnic groups had less to do 
with ethnic grievances and more to do with elite manipulation of the population.
234
 These leaders 
were garnering support from their people (who typically were the same ethnicity), and thus, the 
divides were along ethnic lines. 
Sassou-Nguesso returned to Congo Brazzaville in 1997, after exiling himself for two 
years. Upon his return, fighting broke out between the Cobras and the Cocoyes. Violent clashes 
in Owando resulted in an attempted cease fire agreement on May 31, 1997, but fighting 
continued on June 5th. The violence persisted for several months, claiming the lives of 10,000 to 
15,000 people. Many districts within the state, especially those that were loyal to either Sassou-
Nguesso, or Lissouba, were being heavily bombarded by shells. Eventually, the fighting came to 
a halt on October 15, 1997, once Angola intervened in the conflict. Angola intervened on behalf 
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of Sassou-Nguesso in order to protect its self-interests. Given Angola’s 20 year civil war and 
Lissouba’s support of Unita (the Angolan state’s opposition), Angola made the move in an effort 
to cut off support of its opposition, and ultimately end its internal conflict.
235
 After sending 
thousands of troops to defend Sassou-Nguesso, he was reinstated as President.
236
 The fighting 
was far from over, though. Although Lissouba and Kolelas were exiled for three years, violent 
outbreaks began between the Ninjas and the Cocoyes versus the Cobras and Angolans. This 
fighting consisted of much more disorganized raids of towns outside of Brazzaville, 
predominantly in the Southern region of the state. The radical youths within the militias began to 
act autonomously from the organized groups, causing small clashes on the streets until the end of 
1999. In an effort to establish stability, Sassou-Nguesso provided amnesty to all Cocoye and 
Ninja commanders, allowing for civil servants and soldiers to retake their former positions.
237
 
This concession was crucial in not only suppressing the rebellion, but also buying off Sassou-
Nguesso’s political opposition in order to establish long-lasting stability. Buying off his 
opponents allowed for Sassou-Nguesso to more effectively consolidate power within the fragile 
Congolese state. Moreover, between 2000 and 2001, Sassou-Nguesso increased the dialogue 
between parties involved in the conflict in order to further peace within the state. The Ninjas 
rejected Sassou-Nguesso’s call for peace, and continued to engage in low level fighting against 
the government until 2003. In 2002, Sassou-Nguesso legitimately solidified the Presidency by 
winning the Presidential election, and securing his claim to power. Finally in March 2003, the 
Ninjas agreed to a peace accord with the government, and fighting ceased.
238
 
Foreign Actors 
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 Congo Brazzaville’s relations with foreign actors have proved interesting in molding the 
state. Given its colonial ties to France in the 19th and 20th centuries, the African state has 
maintained relations with its former colonizer. Even after independence, Congo Brazzaville 
remained psychologically attached to the French, even though it was no longer an official 
colony. France maintained its presence in Congo Brazzaville’s oil sector, as the French-owned 
company, Elf-Aquitaine dominated the industry beginning in the late 1980s.  Furthermore, 
France provided significant amounts of aid to its former colony, but this changed in 1991, when 
France transferred the state’s debt to the IMF.239 Although Congo Brazzaville has sought to 
maintain close ties with France, the relationship has been somewhat strained, as Congo 
Brazzaville was formerly socialist. For twenty years, between the 1970s and 1990s, the state was 
distinguished by socialist, and Marxist-Leninist policies. Moreover, Congo Brazzaville closely 
aligned with other communist countries - particularly, China, Russia, and other Eastern bloc 
nations. Relations with these communist countries provided much foreign aid, through education 
and funding, as well as assistance for the Congolese military.  
Since the collapse of communism, however, Congo Brazzaville’s relations with these 
socialist countries have become subdued, and rather, France has increased its role fiscally and 
influentially. The same can be said for its relations with the United States, as the US kept its 
distance during Congo Brazzaville’s socialist era. Once this period ended, the US became more 
cooperative and supportive of the state’s democratization. As fighting broke out in 1997 and 
again in early 2000, the US Embassy was closed and its relations were once again broken. When 
the fighting officially ended in 2003, cooperation was reestablished and plans for a new Embassy 
went underway in 2004. Diplomatic relations between the US and Congo Brazzaville are 
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currently cooperative.
240
 Chinese relations are continuing to grow as well, due to increased 
investment within the African state. Currently, China is Congo Brazzaville’s biggest partner in 
trade. In March 2013, President Xi Jinping travelled to the state, and claimed that “the rapid 
development of bilateral ties has witnessed fruitful cooperation in various dimensions and 
brought tangible benefits to people of both nations.”241 China has additionally provided much aid 
to Congo Brazzaville, including educational assistance. 
 Congo Brazzaville’s foreign relations have significantly impacted the development of the 
state. As a result of its socialist tendencies beginning after independence and lasting until the late 
80s, it became detached from the Western powers, such as France and the United States, and 
closely aligned with socialist countries such as Russia and China. Without Western influence 
during this time, Congo Brazzaville was left virtually alone in running the state. Given the 
political instability during the time, it appears to have hampered the development of the state, 
and furthered the failure of the state apparatus.  
Congo Brazzaville Today 
 Although Congo Brazzaville transitioned to democracy in 1991, the state still suffers 
from unfair elections. When Sassou-Nguesso returned to power after the civil war ended in 1997, 
he adopted a new constitution in 2002, extending the presidential term limit to seven years. In 
2007, legislative elections were held, and Sassou-Nguesso’s Congolese Labor Party (PCT) won a 
majority of seats due to the opposition’s boycott of the election. Furthermore, Sassou-Nguesso 
dissolved the post of the Prime Minister, allowing him to be not only the head of the state, but 
the head of the government. Sassou-Nguesso additionally placed his son, Denis Christel Sassou-
Nguesso, as a member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau through the PCT, causing 
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uproar among the opposition that he will succeed his father.
242
  
 Fraud continues to hamper the fairness of elections in Congo Brazzaville, as it is 
considered “Not Free” by Freedom House and its perceived corruption has increased since 
2012.
243
 In 2012, Denis Sassou-Nguesso was re-elected as President, but the elections were far 
from democratic. Observers claimed the elections to be “marred by fraud, low voter turnout, and 
postelection violence.”244 Similar to many African states transitioning from one-party politics to 
democracy, the state remains relatively autocratic, under the guise of democratic elections. 
President Sassou-Nguesso is able to use state resources in order to ensure his grip on power, 
through election fraud and voter intimidation. Thus, the political situation in Congo Brazzaville 
is far from ideal. The state remains politically unstable, even with Sassou-Nguesso’s attempts at 
strengthening his grip on power. “Democracy” in Congo Brazzaville has not brought about 
positive change. Rather, the state continues to suffer from corruption and fraud, and the state has 
become even less transparent. The lack of transparency stems from the unwillingness of the 
government to release data on oil revenues, as the President’s family controls the state oil 
company. It is difficult to prosecute corruption cases domestically because the President controls 
virtually all aspects of the state, therefore, it often goes unpunished. However, France has 
recently opened an investigation against Sassou-Nguesso for fraud and embezzlement of state 
revenues.
245
  
State Institutions 
 As previously mentioned, because Brazzaville was the capital of French Equatorial 
Africa during the time of colonization, Congo Brazzaville’s education and institutional capacity 
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was highly advanced. After independence, free education and the bureaucracy continued to 
expand, until the international community pressured the state to reform these sectors. Thus, 
Congo Brazzaville has, since its early stages as an autonomous state, been highly developed. 
This seemingly healthy characteristic has contributed to the decline of the state because the 
population was highly educated without employment. As the civil sector was significantly scaled 
back (in the 1990s there were 80,000 civil servant jobs, and in 1994 nearly 8,000 were cut),
246
 
the educated and unemployed youth began to radicalize, leading to political violence and 
increased instability. According to reports in 2010, public expenditure on education was 
approximately 6.2%, making Congo Brazzaville 33rd in the world. While there is certainly a 
correlation between this high percentage and literacy rates, the average school life expectancy is 
lower than its African counterparts. The percentage of the total population above age 15 who can 
read and write is 83.8% and the school life expectancy is nine years.
247
 
Although it appears that the education sector in Congo Brazzaville is much more 
advanced than many of its African neighbors, there are still institutions within the state that have 
deteriorated. The health care system in Congo Brazzaville is among the worst in Africa, with the 
state only spending 2.5% of its GDP on health in 2011, placing it 186th out of 190 countries. 
There is a significant portion of the population that is malnourished, with little chance of 
obtaining medical assistance. Perhaps the most alarming, is that there is only .1 physicians per 
1000 people, which is even worse than its neighbor, the Democratic of Congo (.11 physicians per 
1000 people). Additionally, for every 1000 people, there are only 1.6 hospital beds. It is of little 
surprise then that the life expectancy of the population is a mere 55.6 years and the infant 
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mortality rate is the 16th highest in the world at 72.45 deaths for every 1000 live births.
248
 The 
health care system in Congo Brazzaville is underfunded and subsequently in a perilous state. A 
2007 report claimed that  
Many medical facilities lack the means to meet the basic needs of patients . . . ‘the lifts 
don’t work, windows are broken, there is no drinking water, no toilets, let alone showers’ 
. . . neurology, cardiology, and ophthalmology departments lack the basic equipment to 
carry out essential tests.
249
 
 
Moreover, there is a lack of qualified, motivated, and quality personnel.
250
 In March of 2012, an 
arms depot explosion in Brazzaville neighborhood killed more than 240, and wounded another 
2,300, exposing the negligence and inefficiency of the state in dealing with such a crisis.
251
 The 
health care system within the state is so undeveloped, it does not have the capacity to deal with 
crises involving hundreds of patients. The situation in March overwhelmed the system, as it was 
inadequate to deal with a crisis so small.
252
  
 There have been some measures taken to address the disastrous health care situation, 
however, most come from NGOs and other local organizations, rather than the government itself. 
One initiative taken by the Ministry of Health in 2011 was developing a Performance-based 
Financing system (PFB) in order to improve health services in Congo Brazzaville. This plan 
seeks to increase patient access to healthcare through funding delivery systems. This will include 
extensive training of personnel, in order to promote better quality care. According to the 
government, after eight months of implementation, there have been significant improvements, 
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leading to an expansion of the system.
253
 While this is a step in the right direction for Congo 
Brazzaville, more still needs to be done. Health expenditures must increase in order to meet the 
growing needs of the people because the current system is insufficient. 
Conclusion 
The state apparatus in Congo Brazzaville is deeply troubled. Since independence, the 
state has been plagued with political violence and instability, culminating in an unhealthy state 
apparatus. The perpetual political uncertainty as a result of the coups between the 1960s and 
1990s, has seriously impacted the quality of the state. Political leaders are vying for power in 
order to obtain control of valuable resources, and doing little for the people. Violent clashes have 
resulted in this struggle for power, becoming commonplace for the people in Congo Brazzaville. 
In addition, the economy is undiversified, as it relies solely on its oil exports. Political leaders 
seek to seize complete control of the state, consolidating their power through corrupt and 
fraudulent means. And the state lacks sufficient institutions to provide basic security, healthcare, 
education, and social programs to the population. While the elites in society enjoy the benefits of 
the state’s expansive oil wealth, more than 45% of the population remains below the poverty 
line.
254
  
Although the West believed the solution to Congo Brazzaville’s political instability and 
decaying state was democracy, this system seems to have accomplished little. The economy 
remains reliant on oil, political actors remain corrupt, instability has not dissipated, and 
institutional reform has been slow. The people within Congo Brazzaville may have gained the 
right to vote for their President, but with fraud and frequent boycotting of elections, they have 
not actually gained civil liberty. Democracy in Congo Brazzaville has been an act. Sassou-
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Nguesso has used elections as an illusion to appease the Western World, but these elections are 
not free and fair. They are dominated by Sassou-Nguesso and his political party, and solidify his 
authoritarian rule. If anything, democracy has resulted in more secrecy within the government. 
The patronage networks persist, but they are less open about them, less transparent. Thus, 
democracy is only a show for Sassou-Nguesso. But this needs to change. Congo Brazzaville will 
not produce oil forever. Its reserves are being depleted and are projected to run out in less than 
twenty years. Therefore, it must look towards developing new alternative exports because  
Congo [Brazzaville] still needs to overcome a number of obstacles related to its lack of  
infrastructure, as well as governance problems. Just 36 percent of the population has 
access to electricity . . . [and] the role of the private sector (excluding oil) remains very 
limited . . .  
agriculture represents less than 10 percent of the economy.
255
 
 
The state must wean itself off of its dependence on oil revenues in order to prevent the state from 
collapsing when oil reserves are drained. Infrastructural reform is crucial in achieving this 
because the state is beginning to deteriorate before the people’s eyes. With high revenues, but 
little public expenditure, poverty persists. The government needs to begin to provide basic goods 
and services to the people, such as better healthcare and social programs. Otherwise, the state 
will become more radicalized, and violent upheaval will be continued to be seen as the only 
solution, since this avenue has been frequently used throughout Congo Brazzaville’s bloody past. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
Introduction 
The question remains, as to why Gabon has maintained stability within its territory, while 
Congo Brazzaville has not. While they are both former French colonies, produce roughly equal 
amounts of oil, and boast similar geographic climates, there are fundamental historical 
differences that ultimately result in a gap in stability between Congo Brazzaville and Gabon. 
There are a number of reasons that have caused this divide between the two states, including 
geographic location, relations with France, and political violence in one state and not the other, 
with some factors having a more significant impact than others. Some factors which have 
resulted in Congo Brazzaville’s instability are not the root cause, but simply contribute to the 
problem. In particular, violence from neighboring states threatens its security, but is not the sole 
reason for which Congo Brazzaville is so high on the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index. The 
main reason for instability in Congo Brazzaville and stability in Gabon is due to the actions of 
the French.  
Nature of Transition to Independence 
 First, French colonial influence affected Congo Brazzaville far more negatively than it 
did in Gabon. In Gabon, the Gabonese elite, who were empowered by the French, became 
sympathetic to the French cause - so much so, that they did not want to decolonize in 1960 when 
the rest of the Gabonese public did. Rather, they wanted to maintain close ties with their French 
compadres, in order to continue their mutually beneficial relationship. When the state did finally 
become independent in 1960, the ruling elites remained in power, and maintained close ties with 
the French. Gabon even modeled its political structure after its former colonial power, with a 
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President, Prime Minister, and Parliament, as well as a multi-party system.
256
  
Congo Brazzaville did not have such a smooth transition. As the Southern city of 
Brazzaville was named the capital of the French colony, French Equatorial Africa (AEF), the city 
developed beyond most other colonial towns and cities. Therefore, education of the Southern 
natives of Congo Brazzaville reached higher levels than most other African states, including the 
Congolese living in the Northern region of the state. This was especially true in the Kongo and 
Vili villages which were considered the more privileged villages during the colonial era. A 
highly educated and privileged population in the Southern portion of the state was born in turn. 
The uneven development caused a divide between the more developed South and more rural 
North, increasing Northern resentment against the South. Once Congo Brazzaville gained 
independence in 1960, its relations with France began to decline, as it began to adopt more 
socialist policies. Additionally, post-independence, Northern and Southern factions began to 
emerge, and were pitted against one another.
257
 As unemployment rates heightened, tensions 
continued to flare and the educated, working population became radicalized in effect. The 
radicalization of the educated youth as well as tensions between Northern and Southern 
Congolese would ultimately result in the constant political upheaval that Congo Brazzaville was 
to experience between 1963 to 1997. Therefore, the effect of the urbanization of the South, 
advanced a population that had very few employment opportunities, forcing it to fuse its skills to 
mobilize violent opposition instead.
258
 In the case of Gabon, there was no radicalization of the 
population. Gabon’s transition from colonialism was essentially a continuation of French 
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colonialism, with more freedom. As most of Gabon was pro-French, its alignment with its 
former colonial power afforded it greater stability. 
Neo-Colonialism 
 Neo-colonial ties with France have significantly impacted the development of both 
Congo Brazzaville and Gabon. For Gabon, France has maintained a strong presence within the 
state’s affairs. Beginning with the coup d’etat, ousting pro-French President Leon M’ba from 
power in 1964, France intervened militarily, reinstating M’ba. Moreover, after M’ba passed 
away in 1966, Jacques Foccart falsified the Gabonese constitution in order to ensure the 
Presidency went to another pro-Frenchman, Omar Bongo. Not only did France meddle in 
Gabon’s affairs through empowering leaders who would remain loyal to its former colonial 
power, it also maintained a military garrison within the former colony. This military presence 
allowed for Gabon to spend virtually nothing on its security sector, but still be guaranteed ample 
protection. This included a Secret Service as well as a Presidential Guard, all of which reinforced 
Gabon’s stability.259 France’s presence in Gabon, starting in 1964 sent a message to the 
Gabonese: the state could not be seized militarily, without the French intervening and reversing 
actions by the opposition. Thus, France has played a vital role in maintaining stability in Gabon, 
and ensuring that there be no political upheaval. 
 Congo Brazzaville has had a somewhat different relationship with France. After Felix 
Youlou became president once the state gained independence in 1960, Congo Brazzaville began 
to adopt more socialist policies, shifting further and further left. When Felix Youlou was 
overthrown in 1963 by a military coup, France did not come to his aid. President Youlou shifted 
away from the traditional French system through his socialist policies, distancing Congo 
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Brazzaville from its former colonial power. This ultimately resulted in France’s absence in 
restoring stability in Congo Brazzaville when Youlou was ousted from power. Rather than 
reinstate a socialist, non-French sympathizer, France allowed the military overthrow to stand. 
This action set an alarming precedent for the people of Congo Brazzaville (particularly the 
youth): the opposition had the right to take control of the state and reform in the way they 
deemed fit. This included taking control through militarization and violent upheaval.
260
 What 
would follow from this neglect from France would be over 30 years of violent struggle in order 
to seize power and control over the state’s oil wealth. Congo Brazzaville’s isolation from the 
West reached its peak between the 1970s and the 1990s when Congo Brazzaville adopted more 
Marxist-Leninist policies, through President Marien Ngouabi.  
Congo Brazzaville shifted from a state with socialist policies and parties, to a state which 
adopted a Soviet-style constitution, grew its bureaucracy to astronomical heights, and aligned 
itself with the Soviet Union, China, and other Eastern bloc nations.
261
 This drastic realignment 
isolated Congo Brazzaville from the West, subsequently allowing for its internal turmoil to 
persist without any external intervention. During this approximate 20 year period in Congo 
Brazzaville’s history, there were three different political overthrows, with the first being 
President Ngouabi’s assassination in 1977. Stability was rapidly deteriorating, as the next in line 
for the Presidency, General Yhombi Opango, was only able to maintain power for two years. As 
pressure from the international community was exerted upon Opango to reform the Congolese 
state and shrink the bureaucracy, his favorability among the people proportionally faded,
262
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leading to much instability. This resulted in Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso seizing the 
Presidency in 1977, which he retained until 1991. Isolation from the West allowed for constant 
political upheaval within Congo Brazzaville, as there was no stabilizing power. The state 
opposition was able, time and time again, to overthrow the government, and bring a new leader 
to power. When this leader failed to meet the demands of the radicalized and divided population, 
he was then ousted and room was made for a new leader. Eventually President Sassou-Nguesso 
was able to retain his grip on power for 12 years - longer than any other leader in Congolese 
history up to this point. 
Consolidation of Power 
The inability of political leaders to consolidate power in Congo Brazzaville has 
significantly hindered the state’s stability. Within less than 40 years there have been five 
successful coups. Most leaders have fallen from power due to their inability to maintain 
predominance over their people. In Congo Brazzaville, in particular, leaders struggle to appeal to 
the entire population and put down their opposition given the North-South tensions. Leaders lack 
political legitimacy based on this divide because even though they may be legitimate leaders for 
their particular region, the other region, likely does not agree. While former Presidents such as 
Youlou attempted to appeal to the rural peasantry by associating with the Pygmies, he, as well as 
all other Presidents after him were all unsuccessful and were eventually thrown from power. 
On the other hand, Gabon’s political leader, Omar Bongo, was much more successful in 
maintaining his grip on power. Since becoming President in 1966, he was seen by the Gabonese 
as a “legitimate” President. This was due to his ancestral roots as a Batake, which traced him 
back to the Pygmies. His ties to the Pygmies afforded him “supernatural powers” in the eyes of 
the Bantus (rural peasants in the outlying villages) and subsequently a legitimate claim to the 
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presidency.
263
 Thus, Bongo was able to retain social control over all Gabonese people, because 
he was seen has having a valid claim to power. Additionally, he was much more successful in 
suppressing his opposition, as he used the state’s oil wealth to buy off all of his opponents, 
leaving him virtually uncontested. While some Congolese leaders made similar attempts, such as 
Youlou, they ultimately failed to put down the opposition, and were thrown from power. Thus, 
Bongo was able to do what Congolese leaders could not - consolidate power through legitimizing 
himself to the people and eliminating any threats to his presidency. Furthermore, unlike Congo 
Brazzaville, there was no divide among the Gabonese population. His legitimacy was not 
challenged by an ethnic group, such as the Fang, or a group of Gabonese living within a 
particular region of the state. Bongo maintained social control because the political community 
was more unified than Congo Brazzaville’s. Therefore, Bongo was able to maintain his grip on 
power and more efficiently consolidate power. 
North-South Divide 
 As previously mentioned, there is a divide between the Northern and Southern portion of 
Congo Brazzaville, which was exacerbated by French influence. The French developed most of 
the Southern region of the state, as Brazzaville was made the capital of the AEF, while the 
Northern region of the state remained largely undeveloped (and still does). As 70% of the 
population lives in Brazzaville, it is the most urbanized state in Africa. The North virtually 
remains uninhabited due to the fact that it is dominated by tropical jungle.
264
 By favoring 
particular southern villages, the French created tensions among Northern and Southern 
Congolese. Once Congo Brazzaville gained independence in 1960, the North and South split 
politically, with the creation of the African Socialist Movement (MSA) and the Democratic 
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Union for the Defense of African Interests (UDDIA). The North’s MSA and the South’s UDDIA 
were fundamentally different in their political philosophies in addition to their ethnic and 
geographic divide. The first President, Felix Youlou, was a Northerner and his socialist policies 
caused much unrest among the people, leading to his ousting, and the succession of Alphonse 
Massamba-Debat, a Southerner. Shortly after his rise to power, the North overthrew Massamba-
Debat and replaced him with the Northerner, Marien Ngouabi. Seven years after Ngouabi 
secured the presidency, he was assassinated for his leftist policies (typical of the Northerners). 
He was highly opposed by the working and educated Southern class, and this ultimately led to 
his murder and the rise to power of a more conservative, Northern-born leader. Yhombi Opango 
became President following Ngouabi’s assassination, but was then overthrown by the North’s, 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso because his policies clashed with the North’s Congolese Labor Party 
(PTC).
265
 A common trend can be seen from these political upheavals - not only did these leaders 
fail to consolidate power, they were unsuccessful in appealing to their regional opponents, and 
this subsequently led to succession after succession of Northern and Southern leaders. Congo 
Brazzaville, between the periods of 1960 to 1997, was marked by the constant struggle for power 
between Northern and Southern political elites. Given their political differences, with the MSA 
calling for a strong bureaucracy and socialist policies and the UDDIA calling for close ties with 
France and private ownership,
266
 clashes between the two was inevitable. The problem, however, 
was that there was no stabilizing force to subdue the conflict. This ultimately allowed 
militarization and political violence to occur, without the state being able to do anything to 
contain it. 
 By 1991, Sassou-Nguesso had successfully maintained his grip on power for 
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approximately 13 years. However, as the West pushed for democracy, Sassou-Nguesso lost the 
Presidential elections to Pascal Lissouba, a Southerner. The North-South tensions flared 
following these elections, resulting in a full-out civil war in 1993. All candidates from the 
election formed their own militias, splitting along North-South ethnic lines. It was not until 1997, 
in which the fighting subsided, when Angola finally intervened in support of Sassou-Nguesso, 
putting him back into power. 
 Although a divide between the North and South emerged during colonialism in Congo 
Brazzaville, Gabon has luckily avoided such tensions. While there are a number of different 
ethnic groups (there are about 40), there are “few of the major schisms by language, family, form 
of livelihood, spatial isolation and differing ecologies that divide neighboring countries.”267 
Thus, Gabon does not have any divide among its population, as Congo Brazzaville does. 
The Differential Impact of Democratization  
 Beginning in the early 90s, most African states were under pressure from the 
international community to change from the one-party system and to the multi-party system. The 
democratization of one party states in Africa had mixed success, however. While the West 
believed that democracy was the key to “saving” the perilous states in the underdeveloped 
continent, democracy was not the answer for all of these states. Most states, including Gabon and 
Congo Brazzaville, in an effort to assuage the West, accepted the demands to democratize by 
holding elections. For Gabon, these elections were simply a means of appeasing the West, and in 
actuality did little to promote civil liberty and freedom. Rather than giving the Gabonese the 
right to vote, elections have been marred by fraud and voter intimidation. Omar Bongo and his 
political party won over 90 percent of the vote in most elections during his reign, signifying the 
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failure of elections in bringing about democracy to Gabon. Rather, elections have been used to 
dupe the West into believing that the state is trying to democratize, when it is essentially still a 
one-party state. But, because of Bongo’s ability to maintain power throughout these 
“democratic” elections, stability was preserved, therefore democracy ultimately did not affect 
Bongo’s rule. 
 Congo Brazzaville’s transition to democracy was not quite as smooth. When elections 
were scheduled in 1991, the preliminary vote revealed that Pascal Lissouba and Bernard Kolelas 
were the two candidates that would move to the final round, not the incumbent, Sassou-Nguesso. 
Being defeated in the first round of elections was a blow to Sassou-Nguesso and exposed the 
people’s dissatisfaction with his corrupt ways. But the bigger problem that ensued was the 
uncertainty over control of the state and subsequent oil wealth. With Sassou-Nguesso out of the 
race, there was an opportunity for the South to recapture control of the state’s wealth. Ultimately, 
Lissouba defeated Kolelas and was inaugurated in 1991. Unfortunately, what appeared to be the 
beginning of a freer Congo Brazzaville quickly turned into a state immersed in a violent struggle 
for power. While the Congolese were tired of Sassou-Nguesso’s corruption and opulent lifestyle, 
Lissouba failed to offer a better alternative. Lissouba was pressured to cut the size of the 
bureaucracy and liberalize the economy, all of which proved unfavorable to the Congolese,
268
 
especially since all educated citizens would work for the state. When this opportunity dissipated, 
the educated population once again radicalized.  
Lissouba could not gain control over Sassou-Nguesso’s clientilist and patronage networks 
because many within the networks still remained loyal to Sassou-Nguesso, and therefore 
Lissouba was unable to consolidate power.
269 Eventually, the militarization of all political groups 
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became a reality with Sassou-Nguesso’s Cobras, Lissouba’s Ninjas, and Kolelas’ Cocoyes. The 
dissolution of parliament by Lissouba marked the beginning of a political fight between the 
Cobras and Ninjas, which would last until early 2000. When a ceasefire was reached in 1997 
with Angola’s intervention, Sassou-Nguesso was reinstated as President. The events that ensued 
as a result of democratization in Congo Brazzaville exposed the fragility of the state, causing 
political uncertainty. The fighting between the political groups exposed the divide between the 
North and South and unmasked the problems resulting from these ethnic tensions. 
Bordering States 
Furthermore, both states have very different neighbors. Gabon borders Congo 
Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. While these states are relatively high on the 
Failed State Index, with Equatorial Guinea ranking 47th and Cameroon 27th, neither currently 
suffer from violent conflict which threaten to spill over into Gabon. On the other hand, Congo 
Brazzaville borders Gabon, Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Between these five neighbors, Congo Brazzaville risks the possibility of 
violence pouring over its borders from not just one state, but multiple. In particular, Angola, the 
Central African Republic, and the Democratic of Congo threaten its regional security. 
Historically, Congo Brazzaville has hosted many refugees from these conflicts, with a 
tremendous influx of refugees in 2000. In 1999 the state hosted over 39,000 refugees, but in 
2000, the number skyrocketed to 123,190 as a result of the conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The number has declined slightly, but Congo Brazzaville continues to have around 
100,000 refugees within its borders.
270
 In 2009, there were reports of a refugee crisis in Congo 
Brazzaville, as a result of the violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 
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that year, that UNHCR reported that there were 77,488 refugees in Congo Brazzaville and aid 
agencies could not meet the needs of so many refugees.
271
 Moreover, the violence in the Central 
African Republic has very recently begun to spill into Congo Brazzaville, as reports claim that 
“fratricidal violence” has returned.272 Moreover, with conflicts erupting in the Central African 
Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo recently, the influx of refugees into Congo 
Brazzaville has been equally detrimental. As of 2013, the UNHCR reported that Congo 
Brazzaville was home to over 60,000 refugees from these states, as well as Chad and Rwanda. 
The situation for these refugees has been dire, as the state of Congo Brazzaville lacks the 
capacity to deal with them. There are a number of challenges the refugee crisis poses to Congo 
Brazzaville, as stated by the UNHCR,  
The operational environment poses several logistical challenges to providing 
humanitarian  
assistance to refugees in the north of the country. Challenges include the lack of road 
access to eighty per cent of the refugee population and changing water levels that make 
movements by river impossible during six months of the year.
273
 
 
Congo Brazzaville has difficulty providing basic services to its own people, let alone displaced 
persons from other African states. Thus, the refugee crisis has caused instability within the 
already fragile state. The most destabilizing threat stems from the Central African Republic, as 
the recent escalation of violence has displaced between 80,000 and 100,000 persons, most of 
them seeking refuge in Congo Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other 
neighboring states, with many more expected in the coming months.
274
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Conclusion 
Ultimately what has resulted from the instability in Congo Brazzaville and the stability in 
Gabon is a significant gap in the capacity of statehood between the two former French colonies. 
Due to the violent struggle for state control within Congo Brazzaville, the state has been unable 
to deliver basic goods and services to its people. The instability from the violence has inhibited 
the state’s development due to the constant struggles for power. Furthermore, the fighting has 
physically damaged Congo Brazzaville’s structure, particularly within the city of Brazzaville (as 
well as the outlying towns), where most of the fighting occurred.
275
 Although most of the 
fighting between the Cobras and the Ninjas has subsided, the tensions still exist. Congo 
Brazzaville is not a free state. Elections still continue to be fraudulent and corruption remains 
rampant.
276
 The economy is still highly undiversified, as the state relies predominantly on its oil 
exports for its revenues. Oil revenues only benefit the elites in society, as more than 45 percent 
of the population lives below the poverty line.
277
 While education and literacy rates remain 
relatively high, the healthcare, social service, and security sectors continue to perish. This can be 
seen with its low score of .534 and ranking of 142
nd
 out of 208 states on the HDI.
278
 It is clear 
that Congo Brazzaville is an incredibly troubled state, with few functioning state programs and 
institutions. 
While Gabon is far from the ideal state, it is relatively more stable than many of its 
African neighbors, especially Congo Brazzaville. The absence of violent conflict has afforded 
Gabon far more stability and capacity than its neighbor. Omar Bongo was able to maintain power 
for 40 years with minimal threats to his Presidency, allowing the state to develop beyond Congo 
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Brazzaville. Gabon’s health care, education, security, and social service sector are relatively 
sophisticated for the African state, thus Bongo was not a total tyrant. It has a relatively high 
ranking for an African state on the HDI, given it is 106
th
 out of 208 states with a score of .683.
279
 
While corruption and cronyism existed during Bongo’s reign, and still exist today, his ability to 
silence his opposition was crucial to his success, as well as his well-maintained relationship with 
France. The security in which France provided Gabon during its early years as a newly 
independent state, as well as Bongo’s ability to subdue his opponents and incorporate them into 
the bureaucracy, were crucial in maintaining stability within Gabon. Bongo’s success in 
preventing violent conflict in Gabon has paved the way for his son, President Ali Bongo 
Ondimba, to develop the state further. Through the diversification of the economy and providing 
universal health care to all Gabonese citizens, Ali Bongo can continue to promote stability within 
the state without simultaneously focusing on the threat of internal conflict.  
The same cannot be said of Congo Brazzaville. Given its unstable past, violent conflict 
has hindered its ability to develop, and still does. Unlike Gabon, the beginning of Congo 
Brazzaville’s life as a state was marked with growing tensions between Northern and Southern 
factions, created by the French during the colonial era. The North’s socialist tendencies and 
Youlou’s rise to power, began the distancing of Congo Brazzaville from France. Thus, in 1963, 
when Youlou was thrown from power, the French did not intervene because it was in support of 
Massamba-Debat and his more pro-French tendencies. His fall from power shortly after, 
however, did not merit a French intervention. By the time that Ngouabi came to power in 1968, 
Congo Brazzaville had shifted itself to a socialist state and cut off all ties from the West. By 
aligning itself with the Soviet Union, China, and other Eastern bloc countries, Congo Brazzaville 
was responsible for its own security sector. The French had no part in protecting the state of 
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Congo Brazzaville should a coup d’etat occur, as it did in 1977, when Ngouabi was assassinated. 
Congo Brazzaville ultimately prevented any external intervention in its North-South conquest for 
control of the state. There was no stabilizer that could end the continual battle for power, 
allowing the North and South’s clashes to persist. Therefore, the North and South divide caused 
by the French resulted in the struggle for control of the state. The isolation of Congo Brazzaville 
from France, however, is what perpetuated this state of conflict. Without a stabilizer, as in 
Gabon, Congo Brazzaville’s political upheaval continued until Angola eventually intervened in 
1997, reinstating Sassou-Nguesso. Since returning to power, tensions between the North and 
South remain, but Sassou-Nguesso now has the military support to suppress any threats. His plan 
of incorporating opposition forces into the government has allowed for greater stability, but 
occasional, small-scale guerrilla warfare still persists. According to the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Congo Brazzaville scores a 31 out of 100 in political stability and absence of 
terrorism, an 11 out of 100 in government effectiveness, and  an 8 out of 100 in regulatory 
quality,
280
 signaling that the state of Congo Brazzaville is in dismal shape. Its instability is high, 
the government has no capacity, and it is ineffective as well. Thus, the state has been 
significantly hampered by the fighting. Elections within Congo Brazzaville are not free, and 
corruption is still a large problem. The Corruption Perceptions Index in 2013 ranked Congo 
Brazzaville 154th out of 175 states with a score of 22, down four points from the past year.  In 
contrast, Gabon’s stability is due to the fact that the French did not exacerbate a divide among 
the population and it maintained a strong presence within its former colony after its 
independence. This allowed Omar Bongo to maintain his grip on power, as his opposition could 
not militarily overthrow him without dealing with the French military. This has contributed to 
Gabon’s higher scores in the Worldwide Governance Indicators, as Gabon scores a 57 out of 100 
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in political stability and absence of terrorism, a 24 out of 100 in government effectiveness, and a 
33 in regulatory quality.
281
 In comparison to Congo Brazzaville’s scores, Gabon has much 
maintains much more stability and has an overall healthier state apparatus.  Subsequently, given 
France’s absence in Congo Brazzaville’s political affairs, the opposition in Congo Brazzaville 
had been allowed to militarily seize power, disrupting stability and inhibiting state development. 
Military seizures of power became the norm for Congolese society ever since Youlou’s ousting 
in 1963. Thus, France’s actions have largely impacted the success of Gabon and the failure of 
Congo Brazzaville. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Although there are many similarities between Congo Brazzaville and Gabon, there are 
additionally many differences which have resulted in a significant gap in stability. The absence 
of political violence in Gabon allowed for Bongo to maintain his grip on power for more than 40 
years, while the political violence in Congo Brazzaville inhibiting leaders’ from maintaining 
power since independence. Gabon was able to avoid a turbulent political history such as Congo 
Brazzaville’s because it maintained close relations with France post-independence. France’s neo-
colonial presence in Gabon was critical in maintaining stability in the initial years after 
independence, as it reversed a military coup in 1964. Given its military garrison in Gabon and its 
1964 intervention, France sent a message to the Gabonese that illegitimate political succession 
was not to be tolerated. It was not allowed and it was unsuccessful in bringing about state 
reform. On the other hand, when President Youlou of Congo Brazzaville was overthrown in 
1965, France did not come to his aid. His overthrow was the result of growing tensions between 
the North and South Congolese (the divide that was strengthened by the French during 
colonialism), as the two sides split politically. Youlou was a Northern socialist, and therefore 
France supported the military coup which occurred. However, what it did not anticipate was the 
precedent this set for the Congolese. Militarization was a legitimate means of enacting political 
change. This subsequently led to a period of political violence and military coups until the early 
2000s, resulting in tremendous instability. Thus, France’s actions in Gabon and inaction in 
Congo Brazzaville have impacted the stability of each state. This fundamental difference 
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between the two states’ history is critical because it explains the failure of one state, while 
explaining the success of the other. The explanation allows for a greater understanding of what 
can contribute to a state’s failure or success. Therefore, by looking at these two cases, it is clear 
that France’s contributions to Gabon’s security sector was instrumental in maintaining security 
within the state, while, the neglect of Congo Brazzaville resulted in political turmoil for decades. 
The instability has hindered the Congolese state’s capacity in delivering basic goods and services 
to its people. Thus, the instability in Congo Brazzaville has affected the state’s ability to function 
properly. Gabon, on the other hand, has not been plagued by political violence and instability, 
and subsequently has a relatively healthier state apparatus, given that it has a universal health 
care system, high education levels, less corruption, etc. By looking at these two cases, and the 
different trajectory each case highlights, the international community must recognize the 
importance of maintaining stability in these states. While Gabon is far from the ideal state, it is 
still one of the most stable African states, and boasts advanced state programs, which Congo 
Brazzaville lacks. In order to develop African states, stability must first be present. 
